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In this study, we employ social network mapping techniques to analyze the shape 
and structure of the networked public sphere in the Arab region. The analysis is 
based on four distinct views of digitally connected communities: a regional map 
of the blogosphere and maps of Twitter networks in three countries: Egypt, 
Tunisia, and Bahrain. This media ecology mapping across these different 
platforms and regions offers a detailed view of social, cultural, religious, and 
political expression through digital media. We observe that the networked public 
sphere in the Arab region is much different than it was five years ago. With the 
decline in the blogosphere, Twitter and Facebook now host a large portion of the 
Arab networked public sphere. By all indications, the networked public sphere is 
more contentious, more highly polarized, and less conducive to broadly inclusive 
social mobilization. In Egypt, we see polarized debates on Twitter that divide 
politically active users into three distinct and largely disconnected groups. In 
Bahrain, the antagonism between the government and opposition is manifest in a 
bipolar network structure on Twitter, and the debate is framed in sectarian 
language that appears intent on deepening the political divide. In comparison, the 
Twitter network in Tunisia appears to be much more integrated and the discourse 
between political opponents less hostile, despite the political rivalries there. In 
each of these countries, the networked public sphere continues to offer a venue for 
civil society and individual voices that is less restrictive than traditional media. 
While pro-government actors are now more active in digital spaces compared to 
several years earlier, the discourse in Egypt, Bahrain, and Tunisia is still tilted 
towards those that support freedom of speech, civil liberties, and political reform.  
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INTRODUCTION	  
Several years have passed since a wave of protests swept through the Middle East and North 
Africa. The ramifications of these events are still being felt across the region. The central role of 
civil society activists and citizens in the protest movements and their adept use of digital 
technologies have prompted many questions for researchers and political observers. These events 
invigorated the debate over the impact of technology on social and political processes. Did the 
adoption of digital communication tools accelerate the processes of change and expand the scale 
of the protests? Have these tools shifted the balance of power in favor of civil society activists 
and organizations?  
 
In this study, we employ social network mapping techniques to analyze the shape and structure 
of the networked public sphere in the Arab region. We generate and analyze four distinct views 
of the communities that emerge in the digital sphere: a map of the blogosphere across the region 
and maps of Twitter networks in three countries: Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain.  
 
This media ecology mapping across these different platforms and regions offers a view of social, 
cultural, religious, and political expression through digital media. Compared to topically focused 
studies, this mapping offers a systematic approach to understanding the new media landscape at 
a broad scale and the set of issues and interests that engender discussion and debate in the 
networked public sphere. This analysis not only offers a perspective on the issues that command 
attention in the region but also provides a view of the structures and communities that form 
around different topics in addition to social, religious, and political affiliations. By combining 
these several approaches into one study, we are able to compare activity and community between 
different platforms, across different regions, and over time.  
 
Participation in the blogosphere has declined over the past several years, coinciding with an 
increase in activity on social media, primarily on Facebook and Twitter. Political activity has 
shifted notably away from the blogosphere to social media. The focus of attention has shifted 
somewhat as well. Compared to a 2009 blogosphere study, less is written about Palestine, and 
comparatively more about Syria. It appears that more attention is on domestic issues and less on 
pan-Arab issues and causes, although militancy and foreign wars are a central focus for some 
groups.  
 
The networked public sphere in the Arab region is much different than it was five years ago. 
These differences extend beyond the shift to new platforms—Twitter and Facebook now host a 
large portion of the Arab networked public sphere—and include profound changes in the 
political orientation and profile of individuals that participate, as well as shifts in the culture and 
degree of contention. Many of the early adopters of digital technologies who played a central 
role in the emergence of the Arab networked public sphere, a substantial portion of whom argued 
for political change and progressive causes, are still present. The entry of late adopters of social 
media has served to diversify the networks and level the playing field. The early adopters are 
now confronted with a wider range of competing voices and opinions, many of whom represent 
state and state-aligned perspectives. The reform voices now constitute a smaller portion of the 
overall online discourse and are met with greater opposition online from government and those 
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from civil society with opposing views. By all indications, the networked public sphere is more 
contentious, more highly polarized, and less conducive to broadly inclusive social mobilization.  
 
In Egypt, we see highly polarized debates on Twitter that divide politically active users into three 
distinct and largely disconnected poles. When they do interact, the discourse is often hostile and 
defined by sharply conflicting visions over the political future of Egypt. In Bahrain, the 
antagonism between the government and opposition is manifest in a bipolar network structure on 
Twitter, and the debate is framed in sectarian language that appears intent on deepening the 
political divide.  In comparison, the Twitter network in Tunisia appears to be much more 
integrated and the discourse between political opponents less hostile, despite the intense political 
rivalries there. The Tunisian Twittersphere is better integrated across the different political 
coalitions and the network does not show the same level of partisanship. The differences in the 
structure of digital networks and the varying levels of polarization in Egypt, Bahrain, and Tunisia 
are clearly evident in the network maps, which are described in detail later in this paper. 
 
	   	   	  
Egypt	  Twitter	  Map	   Bahrain	  Twitter	  Map	   Tunisia	  Twitter	  map	  
 
Despite the growing presence of communities in the networked public sphere that support the 
traditional seats of power in the region, we see that the digital sphere still offers an important 
outlet for non-traditional voices. Among the most followed accounts in each of the three Twitter 
networks are users who would not be able to gain prominence and reach in national media 
networks. These include political activists, opposition leaders, reformers, and human rights 
advocates. 
THE	  NETWORKED	  PUBLIC	  SPHERE	  
The focus of this study is on the networked public sphere and its role in facilitating social 
mobilization and the formation of social capital.  The networked public sphere, as described by 
Benkler, forms an alternative arena for public discussions and political discourse that is less 
dominated by large media entities, is more open to broad participation, and is less subject to 
government control. This digitally mediated alternative public sphere may feature an agenda that 
differs in scope and emphasis from government media sources and larger media outlets that are 
subject to government controls and more highly influenced by traditional sources of economic 
and social power. Benkler also points to the changes in the mode of media production made 
possible by digital networks including the emergence of non-market peer-produced structures 
that rival traditional commercially based media entities.  
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Early scholarship in this area included optimistic views of the impact on digital technologies on 
knowledge production and sharing. Negroponte offered one such optimistic view, asserting that 
individually tailored media (the “Daily Me”) would help citizens to become better informed.1 
Benkler asserted that the digitally enabled commons would assist in information production and 
diminish the influence of the state and traditional media in shaping public discourse,2 and that 
decentralized peer production would increase participation and expand the diversity of views.3 
Others offered more skeptical views. Sunstein argued that the ability to more easily shape one’s 
media diet would lead to fragmentation and polarization, which would erode public discourse.4 
 
Many scholars that looked at digital media systems, however, found concentration rather than 
fragmentation. Linking patterns on the Web tend to follow a power law distribution characterized 
by a small number of media sources receiving a majority of the attention.5 This suggested that 
while it was getting easier to publish materials available to a wide audience, few of these 
materials were being noticed.6 Benkler posited that broader participation in public debates would 
still take place, as ideas would propagate through the networked public sphere and less 
prominent voices with novel perspectives could be amplified and made more visible through 
linking behavior.7 Similarly, Drezner and Farrell claimed that political bloggers who were read 
by incumbent media could indirectly influence public debates.8 
 
The often-cited Adamic and Glance study of partisan linking in the United States political 
blogosphere offered support for Sunstein’s vision of increasing polarization.9 Their study found 
that only one in six links among liberal and conservative bloggers crossed the partisan divide. 
Benkler questioned whether this was evidence of growing polarization or simply a normal 
expression of homophily.10 Hargittai, Gallo, and Kane demonstrated that many of the links 
across the aisle were based in substantive debate.11 They also found that the blogosphere showed 
no signs of growing polarization over time. Gentzkow and Shapiro similarly countered 
arguments over Internet-facilitated polarization with evidence that individuals are exposed to a 
                                                
1 Negroponte, N. (1995). Being digital. New York: Vintage Books. 
2 Benkler, Y. (1998b). The Commons as a Neglected Factor of Information Policy.   26th Annual 
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference. Alexandria, VA September 1998. See also: Benkler, Y. (1999). 
Free as the air to common use: First amendment constraints on enclosure of the public domain. New York University 
Law Review, 74, 354-446. 
3 Benkler, Y. (2000). From Consumers to Users: Shifting the deeper structures of regulation towards sustainable 
commons and user access.  Federal Communications Law Journal, 52, 561-579. 
4 Sunstein, C. (2001). Republic.com. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
5 Barabási, A.-L. & Albert, R. (1999). Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science, 286, 509-512. See also: 
Shirky, C. (2003, February 10). Power laws, weblogs, and inequality. Retrieved from 
http://www.shirky.com/writings/powerlaw_weblog.html. 
6 Hindman, M. (2008). The Myth of Digital Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
7 Benkler, Y. (2006). The wealth of networks: How social production transforms markets and freedom. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press. 
8 Drezner, D. & Farrell, H. The power and politics of blogs. Public Choice, 134, 15-30. 
9 Adamic, L. and Glance, N. (2005). The political blogosphere and the 2004 US election: Divided they blog. In 
Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Link Discovery. Chiba, Japan: ACM Press. 
10 Benkler, 2006. 
11 Hargittai, E., Gallo, J., & Kane, M. (2008). Cross-ideological discussions among conservative and liberal 
bloggers. Public Choice, 134, 67-86. 
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wider range of viewpoints on the Internet compared to through offline interactions and media 
exposure.12 
 
A distinct but related focus of inquiry looks at the role of digital technologies in fostering civic 
engagement, social mobilization, and political participation. Bimber, Flanagin, and Stohl 
describe the development of organizations that are structured in more distributed ways and that 
offer greater latitude for individual participation.13 They posit the emergence of alternatives 
organizational models that are based less in hierarchical structures and that allow for greater 
individual agency and distributed collective action. Shirky similarly articulates the diminishing 
role of traditional organizations as parts of their functional roles are replaced by digitally 
mediated collective action in what he calls “organizing without organizations.”14 Bennett and 
Segerberg highlight the heightened role of personal communication in new organizational 
models.15 They emphasize the difference between the “logic of collective action associated with 
high levels of organizational resources and the formation of collective identities, and the less 
familiar logic of connective action based on personalized content sharing across media 
networks.” 
 
Farrell points to three key mechanisms that affect the role of the Internet and politics.16 First, 
echoing Bimber and others, the declining costs for organizing collective action enable new 
opportunities for social mobilization. Second, the ability to more easily locate and communicate 
with like-minded individuals online facilitates homophilous sorting—the tendency for 
individuals with common interests to form communities. The third factor is that the Internet 
might offer a safer arena for individuals to express their true political views. 
 
The work of Mutz brings into question whether deliberation and civil engagement are 
compatible. She notes that those who are exposed to and more tolerant of opposing views are 
less politically active.17 Lawrence, Sides, and Farrell observe that blog readers tend to be more 
active in politics but that the most polarized are also the politically engaged.18 
 
The use of digital tools by activists and organizers during protest movements over the past 
several years in countries around the world has garnered much attention and controversy. 
Activists in a growing number of countries (e.g. Ukraine, Moldova, Iran, Egypt, Tunisia, and 
Spain, among others) have integrated the use of digital tools into their playbook. While some 
popular accounts have lauded the advent of such “Twitter revolutions,” more careful accounts 
reject explanations that drift towards technological determinism. Although the introduction of 
                                                
12 Gentzkow, M. & Shapiro, J. (2011). Ideological segregation online and offline. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 126, 1799-839. 
13 Bimber, B., Flanagin, A., & Stohl, C. (2012). Collective action in organizations: Interaction and engagement in 
an era of technological change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
14 Shirky, C. (2008). Here comes everybody: The power of organizing without organizations. New York: Penguin 
Books. 
15 W. Lance Bennett & Alexandra Segerberg (2012): The Logic of Connective Action, Information, Communication 
& Society, 15:5, 739-768  
16 Farrell, H. (2012). The consequences of the Internet for politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 15, 35-52. 
17 Diana Mutz. (2206) Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy. Cambridge University 
Press. 
18 Lawrence, E., Sides, J., & Farrell, H. (2010). Self-segregation or deliberation? Blog readership, participation, and 
polarization in American politics. Perspectives on Politics, 8(1), 141-157. 
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digital tools might alter the balance power in interesting ways, the ultimate successes and 
limitations of social movements are still a question of human agency. Several studies have 
looked at the role of digital tools in the protest movements in the Arab region starting in 2011 
and concluded that these technologies played a significant role in building networks, organizing 
protests, and providing an alternative source of reporting of activities on the ground (e.g. Howard 
& Hussain, 2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012; Beuer, 2012; Khondker, 2011; Khamis & Vaughn, 
2011; Lynch, 2011).19 Other studies that have focused on the Indignados movement in Spain and 
Occupy Wall Street have come to similar conclusions (e.g. see Pickerill & Krinsky, 2012).20 
 
Some are skeptical about the role of digital technologies in social mobilization and political 
change. One criticism is that online organizing does not build the stable relationships and ties 
necessary for maintaining social movements.21 And while the most wildly optimistic views of the 
potential for digitally mediated collective action have predicted the eventual end of authoritarian 
rule, more measured accounts have pointed out the efforts of governments to rein in freedom of 
expression online and online activism.22 Governments have implemented a broad range of 
strategies to shape online discourse, including Internet filtering, content removal, cyberattacks, 
surveillance, restrictive legal environments, extra-legal threats, and pro-government information 
campaigns. The impact of some of these restrictions are well understood, for example the content 
blocked by Internet filters by the several dozen countries that implement systematic national 
filtering policies.23 The impact of strategies designed to induce self censorship are more difficult 
to measure and are not well documented.  
RESEARCH	  QUESTIONS	  AND	  METHODOLOGY	  
We explore in this research the structure of Arabic blogosphere and Twittersphere and the nature 
of participation in online life. We also examine the content and substance of online discourse in 
the two spheres, and try to understand the shape and makeup of communities within the context 
of overall civic engagement. Specifically, we raise the following two research questions: 
 
●   What is the structure of the networked public sphere, and how do different segments and 
platforms interact? 
●   What content and topics are introduced and disseminated in the networked public sphere? 
 
The analysis in this report is based on a mixed methods research protocol that includes 
qualitative content analysis supported and guided by algorithmically drawn network maps and a 
diverse set of quantitative metrics calculated for each of the clusters in the network. This 
                                                
19 Howard, P. & Hussain, M. (2011). The upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia: The role of digital media. Journal of 
Democracy, 22, 35-48. See also: Tufekci, Z. & Wilson, C. (2012). Social media and the decision to participate in 
collective action: Observations from Tahrir Square. Journal of Communication, 62, 363-379. 
20 Pickerill, J. & Krinsky, J. (Eds.). (2012). Occupy! (special issue). Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, 
Cultural and Political Protest, 11(3-4). 
21 Van Laer, J. & Van Aelst, P. (2010). Internet and social movement action repertoires: Opportunities and 
limitations. Information, Communication & Society, 13, 1146-1171. 
22 Shanthi Kalathil, Taylor C. Boas (2003) Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on 
Authoritarian Rule.Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
23 See, for example, the research conducted by the OpenNet Initiative: www.opennet.net 
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methodological approach to this study follows similar efforts in the past to map online networks 
that correspond to particular geographic areas.24 
 
A principal objective of this study is to describe accurately the activity on these different 
networks and to compare the structures that emerge and the issues that inspire participation and 
debate. To help make order of this rich, complex, and diverse media landscape, we employ social 
network mapping techniques to generate network maps. The first step is to generate a network 
map based on the relationships between users. The Twitter maps are based on the follows 
relationships between users. The basis of the blogosphere map is the links between blogs.  The 
network structure is visualized using a physics model layout algorithm (Fruchterman-
Rheingold), overlaid with colors representing each account’s assignment to a group based on a 
clustering of network relationships. The resulting network map and structures that emerge reflect 
the individual decisions of bloggers and Twitter users to follow or link to other users, and the 
work of the clustering algorithm that transform these relationships into a set of individual groups 
or segments.  Qualitative human judgment is subsequently used to interpret the results, but the 
generation of the maps is based primarily on algorithms that translate the relationships between 
the accounts into a network structure.  
 
The process of generating network maps started in the Spring 2013. Each of the maps are based 
on data collection which occurred over a three-month period: October through December 2013 
for the map of the blogosphere, February through April 2014 for the Egypt Twitter map, January 
through March 2014 for the Bahrain Twitter map, and April through June 2015 for the Tunisia 
Twitter map. The subsequent review and analysis of accounts that make up these maps took 
place over a period of 20 months, from January 2014 to August 2015. 
 
The location of nodes on the map is based on observable decisions of individuals to link to 
others. These follow and linking choices tend to reflect longer term stable relationships. Drawing 
maps based on mentions and retweets would produce maps based in larger part on shorter term 
interests and influenced more by the content of tweets within the period in which data is 
collected. 
 
In the visualization, the size of each node reflects the number of inlinks or follows from within 
the network to that account. The location of each node relative to the others is based on the 
collective decisions of all of the nodes in the network; each decision by a user in the network to 
follow another Twitter user or link to another blog is factored into the creation of the map.25 The 
algorithm applies an outward force on all nodes in the network that pushes the nodes away from 
each other. A countervailing force is applied to accounts that are linked by a follow or linking 
relationships that pulls them back together as though by a spring or force of gravity.  In this way, 
densely interconnected network neighborhoods are created in the maps that serve as a picture of 
the pattern of influence and information flow in the network. In a second process, a clustering 
                                                
24 Etling, B., Kelly, J., Faris, R., & Palfrey, J. (2010). Mapping the Arabic Blogosphere: Politics and Dissent Online. 
New Media & Society 12 (8), 1225-1243. John Kelly, Vlad Barash, Karina Alexanyan, Bruce Etling, Robert Faris, 
Urs Gasser, John Palfrey. 2012. Mapping Russian Twitter. Berkman Center Research Publication. 
25 The automated system cannot distinguish “friendly” links—those in which a user would endorse or recommend to 
others the views of the other account they choose to follow—from links to those that hold opposing views and are 
chosen to receive news and updates on their activities. In networks where a majority of links are directed towards 
similar-minded users, the links to opposing views do not impede the emergence of affinity-based clusters. 
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algorithm assigns each node in the map to a particular cluster; the cluster assignments are shown 
by the different colors in the maps. These clusters are based on outward facing attention so that 
each cluster is populated by nodes with a common outlook. For the Twitter maps, this is 
informed by the accounts that they follow, mention, retweet, and reply to, and the URLs they 
include in tweets. In the blogosphere map, the attention-based clusters are shaped by outlinks to 
other blogs and other web resources such as digital media sources and videos.  
 
A variety of metrics are calculated to help researchers understand and describe the contours and 
structures of the map. These metrics provide a quantitative measure of which activities occur 
proportionately more often in each cluster compared to the others. For the Twitter maps, this 
includes: 
 
●   Twitter accounts followed 
●   Twitter accounts mentioned, retweeted and replied to within a timeframe 
●   URLs cited in tweets and hashtags 
●   Words used, including bigrams and trigrams (pairs and triples of words that co-occur) 
●   Countries, cities, and other locations mentioned in user profiles 
 
In mapping the blogosphere, researchers have access to the links to other blogs, the URLs that 
are cited in blog posts, and the frequency of words that appear in blog posts. 
 
Researchers apply labels to each of the clusters based on a review of this data. These labels are 
not meant to categorize each account within a given cluster but rather offer concise shorthand 
descriptions for the various clusters. Each of the accounts within each of the clusters offers a 
unique perspective. For many of the accounts within a cluster, the cluster label offers a good 
summary of the primary focus and general orientation of the account; for other accounts, the 
cluster label does not strongly capture the interests and views of the user. 
 
A multistage process is used to determine which accounts are included in the maps. This same 
process applies to the creation of blog and Twitter maps. The mapping starts with a seed set of 
accounts compiled by researchers.26 This set is expanded by adding all of the followers of the 
seeds, and then reduced by removing all accounts with no activity over the prior 90 days. 
Accounts with fewer than a 100 followers are removed next.  The network of connections 
between these accounts is analyzed, and a k-core analysis is used to find the most connected 
accounts. The k-core analysis sets a threshold number of connections—the “k” in k-core—and 
removes any nodes that fall below this threshold. Inclusion in the network is based on three main 
criteria: the accounts must be active; accounts must meet a minimum threshold of links with 
others accounts in the network, whether following or followed by other accounts; and accounts 
must have at least one follower from within the network. The final maps, which include several 
thousand nodes, therefore include all the accounts that receive a minimum threshold of attention 
from the network and remove the accounts with relatively fewer followers in the network. This 
                                                
26 The seed sets, typically 100 or more accounts, are hand-curated lists of Twitter accounts and blogs. The accounts 
that are collected are restricted to those that are easily recognized as part of the targeted country or community. The 
lists are based in part on the domain-specific knowledge of experts and users embedded in the community of users, 
in part on following links from a starting set, and in part on web searches for relevant accounts. Each seed set 
includes accounts representative of the political, social, and cultural issues in the country. 
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produces maps that are both rich in detail and resolution while being of a tractable size for 
quantitative and qualitative analysis. Removing the peripheral and less prominent accounts 
reduces somewhat the range of views and ideas represented in the maps, leaving the accounts 
and clusters that are more squarely in the public view. This is consistent with our focus of 
attention on the networked public sphere, the major clusters in the network and topics of frequent 
discussion. 
BLOGOSPHERE	  NETWORK	  MAP	  OVERVIEW	  
The analysis of the Arab blogosphere and Twitter in the region are based on a similar set of 
methods, tools, and protocols with a few key differences. This blogosphere map encompasses the 
region as a whole rather than the individual country Twitter analyses. This allows us to compare 
the state of the blogosphere to a 2009 study using the same scope and methods. The other key 
difference is that the relationships between blogs are based on links rather the follows, mentions, 
and retweets particular to Twitter. At a conceptual level, the mixed-methods approach we 
employ to understand activity on Twitter and blogs are the same; social network tools are used to 
identify and cluster topical communities based on linking behavior of users, and these maps are 
used as a framework for researchers to explore and describe the content and topical coverage of 
clusters. 
 
 
Figure	  1:	  Arab	  Blogosphere	  Map	  2014	   
 
Bloggers use the digital sphere to communicate and offer commentary on a wide variety of 
topics, including personal matters, public debates, politics, religion, and social issues. In this 
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study, we see that the Arab blogosphere still serves as a platform for civic discourse, but there 
are indications that the blogosphere is declining in size and activity as users adopt social media 
and microblogging. Activists are increasingly shifting to these new digital tools to expand their 
influence. The diminution of the blogosphere is not peculiar to the Arab cyberspace. Researchers 
have found that the size and activity of the Persian blogosphere has also faded since 2009.27 
 
The decline of the blogosphere is manifest in several ways. First, fewer countries are now 
represented in the map. Saudi Arabia, a country that appeared as the second largest network in 
the 2009 study, no longer has a visible presence in the Arab blogosphere. Much of online 
discussion and network formation this activity appears to now take place on Twitter, which hosts 
a vibrant, rich, and dynamic network of Saudi users.28 Another manifestation is the decline in 
overall activity in the blogosphere. Many bloggers have abruptly stopped blogging without 
leaving final notes. Some blogs have been inactive since 2009, and some blogs have been 
removed for unknown reasons. Signs of traditional blogging fatigue emerge across the entire 
Arab blogosphere, but it is more pervasive in some clusters than others.  
 
 
Figure	  2:	  Arab	  Blogosphere	  Map	  2009 
                                                
27 Giacobino, L., Abadpour, A., Anderson, C., Petrossian F., and Nellemann, C., “Whither Blogestan: Evaluating 
Shifts in Persian Cyberspace,” March 2014, http://www.iranmediaresearch.org/en/research/download/1607. 
28 Noman, Helmi and Faris, Robert and Kelly, John, “Openness and Restraint: Structure, Discourse, and Contention 
in Saudi Twitter” (December 2015). Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2015-16. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2700944 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2700944. 
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In the 2009 Arab blogosphere study, political discourse in Egypt coalesced into three active 
clusters (Secular Reformist, Wider Opposition, and Muslim Brotherhood). The Egyptian 
political blogosphere in 2014 is concentrated in two clusters (Egypt Political Left-Leaning and 
Muslim Brotherhood). Both are comprised of significantly fewer blogs, and the level of activity 
has fallen steeply over the past several years. The Left-Leaning cluster is relatively more active 
than the Muslim Brotherhood cluster, although only a fraction of the blogs have been updated 
in 2014. A majority of the Muslim Brotherhood blogs were last updated in the period of 2010-
2012. A new cluster of Egyptian educators emerged that was not visible in the 2009 map and is 
unique to Egypt. The blogs in the cluster are run by educators and teachers from different 
districts across Egypt. They actively blog about the education sector in the country and voice 
their frustrations with the educational system and their support for the work being done to 
improved conditions. 
 
In addition to the disappearance of Saudi Arabian clusters from the map, the shape and 
composition of other Gulf communities in the blogosphere has also changed. The Kuwaiti cluster 
remains and continues to be generally active but at a diminished level. Oman, which did not 
appear as a separate cluster in 2009, is now represented on the map by bloggers who write about 
a variety of issues that include political, social, and literary commentary.  
 
Another community that has visibly shrunk is the Islam-related cluster. The 2009 map contained 
significantly more clusters focusing on religion and people’s faith in Islam. These blogs were 
found in stand-alone clusters and embedded in various nation communities. In 2014, many of 
these communities are no longer as visible or active. Activity in 2014 is reduced to one Islam-
focused cluster populated by scholars and clerics from several different countries providing 
information and research on Islam, especially associated with the Sunni sect. Another cluster 
populated by bloggers commenting on personal and social issues often from an Islamic 
perspective. 
 
A clear shift in the topical focus of the blogosphere is the redirection of attention away from the 
Palestinian conflict to more domestic political and social issues. The 2009 report found that 
many bloggers would refer to the conflict in Palestine in some manner. Both the uprisings across 
the Arab world and the general inactivity of many of the bloggers has limited the focus on this 
conflict, which has featured prominently on the media landscape for decades.  
 
In 2014, we see the adoption of new platforms and a growing array of blog hosting platforms. In 
2009, embedding YouTube videos on blogs was seen as a novel approach. In 2014, the use of 
Tumblr and the shift of bloggers to social media has become the norm, with some bloggers 
highlighting their social media accounts on their blogs. A distinct cluster, not tied to any country, 
is comprised of Tumblr users. With the exception of this cluster, the majority of bloggers choose 
Blogger as their platform, while WordPress is used by a minority of bloggers. Notably, many 
Islamic scholars and bloggers in the English-speaking Kuwaiti social cluster choose to self-host 
their sites instead of having them hosted on blogging platforms.  
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EGYPT	  
Egypt, the most populous Arab country, comprises the largest portion of Arab language 
blogosphere. The two Egyptian clusters in the map that focus on political issues represent strong 
and distinct ideologies: Egypt Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt Political Left-Leaning. The 
Muslim Brotherhood cluster is populated by group members who openly show their affiliation 
either by displaying the group’s banners on their blogs or through opinionated commentary. 
Many display banners saying “proud to be a member of Ikhwan” or “I am Ikhwan.”29 The 
discourse centers on political and social issues in Egypt and offers the group’s perspectives and 
positions on various issues. The cluster however is largely inactive. Many of the blogs have not 
been updated since as early as 2009. Very few show any activity in 2014. It is noteworthy that 
many of the bloggers in the Muslim Brotherhood cluster, although not contributing new posts to 
their blogs, have updated banners with the Rabia sign, suggesting the desire to continue to voice 
their political ideology on their blogs despite blogging fatigue. The Rabia sign is a reference to 
the location in Cairo—Rabia Square—where a large sit-in took place in August 2013 to protest 
the removal of the Morsi-led government by the military. Thousands of people were killed or 
injured when the protests were dispersed by the Egyptian security forces. The Rabia sign is a 
symbol of solidarity with the Muslim Brotherhood and opposition to the government of President 
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.   
 
 
Figure	  3:	  Rabia	  sign,	  a	  symbol	  of	  solidarity	  with	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood. 
 
The Egypt Political Left-Leaning cluster is characterized by a mixture of progressive, reform-
minded, secular, and left-leaning perspectives on Egypt’s political issues, including the January 
25 revolution and consequent developments, political reform, human rights, and civic 
engagement.  Many of the bloggers embrace an activist stance and discuss socio-political topics 
                                                
29 Ikhwan is the Arabic term for Muslim Brotherhood. 
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such as sexual harassment in Egypt. With the exception of a few blogs, the cluster has been 
largely inactive for the past 2 years. The reflections and commentary do not represent the most 
recent developments in Egypt. 
 
 
Figure	  4:	  Egyptian	  Political	  Blogs 
 
Figure	  5:	  Egyptian	  Personal	  Diaries	  and	  Literary	  Blogs 
We find one cluster that is devoted to a singular cause. The Egypt Education cluster is 
comprised of blogs that are dedicated almost entirely to discussing the education sector in Egypt 
and the grievances of teachers. Additional political clusters on the map do not share a common 
or coherent political perspective. The cluster Egypt Political & Social is a community of 
bloggers commenting on Egyptian political developments as well as on social issues, but by and 
large, the accounts in this cluster have no strong activist or advocacy positions on any of the 
issues discussed. Similarly, the discourse in Egypt Political Social Religious includes political, 
social, and religious commentary, often with overlap between the different perspectives. Another 
cluster, Egypt Social, is almost entirely made up of reflections on public social life, family 
matters, and the intersection between personal issues and societal expectations.  
 
Other Egyptian clusters are apolitical, with interests in diaries, literature, love and romance. 
Egypt Personal Diaries & Romance is populated mostly by individuals keeping diaries on 
various social issues, and who write about love and romance using prose and poetry, often with a 
tone of anguish. Some of the women bloggers use pseudonyms, possibly to avoid the social 
repercussions of discussing topics considered sensitive in conservative families. Another cluster, 
Egypt Personal Diaries, includes reflections on issues of daily life, personal reactions to 
political and social events, and commentary on entertainment news. Bloggers in the Egypt 
Social & Literary cluster reflect on social life in Egypt from personal experiences and 
observations, while others in the same cluster showcase their literary works, or provide 
commentary on the work of other writers. Users in the cluster Egypt/Diaries English post diary-
style entries and write about their travels.  
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PALESTINE	  
Two clusters are directed at Palestine: Palestine English and Palestine Arabic. The blogs in 
these clusters are primarily centered around the Israeli occupation, although with somewhat 
different focal areas. The English cluster is more concerned about the struggle for self-
determination and the organization of campaigns to end the Israeli occupation. Campaigns in this 
cluster include the US Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation (endtheoccupation.org), the 
Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (pacbi.org), and the 
Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association (addameer.org). On the other hand, the Arabic 
cluster more generally contains individual bloggers reflecting on life under the occupation and 
writing about their personal experiences in various formats including political commentary, 
personal diaries, poetry, and prose. Most recent posts indicate a shift in the discourse around 
Palestine; it is not discussed as a pan-Arab issue, but rather as local one. This is also apparent 
when comparing the Arab blogosphere of 2009 to the present day blogosphere. The Palestinian 
conflict is no longer a common topic of discussion in the Jordanian, Lebanese, and Syrian 
clusters of the 2014 blogosphere as it was in 2009.  
 
SYRIA	  
Syria is the theme of two clusters in the 2014 blogosphere map. Syria Pro-Revolution features 
Syrian bloggers in support of the revolution against the Syrian regime. The discussion also 
covers the division among the opposition actors and controversies about the militant groups 
fighting in Syria. The cluster does not reflect, however, the most recent developments in Syria. 
Some of the blogs have not been updated since 2012 or 2013. In the other Syrian cluster, Syria 
Social & Political, discussion is devoted mainly to Syrian history, culture, food, and social life. 
The Syrian revolution is not a strong theme in this cluster, but when discussed it is in a 
supportive tone. English is the main language of this cluster. It is notable that support of the 
Assad regime is not present in either of the Syrian clusters.  
 
KUWAIT	  
Three Kuwaiti clusters are found on the 2014 map. Kuwait Political is comprised mostly of 
political commentary on local political issues, often with a critical tone. The comments react to 
government policies, parliamentary affairs, and media stories. Updates are infrequent, and many 
blogs have not been updated for the past couple of years. The Kuwaiti Social cluster contains 
mostly Kuwaitis commenting on various social matters, often based on personal experiences. 
Updates in this cluster also are infrequent. The third cluster, Kuwait Social Media, is populated 
by both Kuwaitis and expatriates living in Kuwait who post information about fashion, food, 
nightlife, and smartphones. The cluster is mainly in English. Compared to the other two clusters, 
posting in this cluster is more frequent and is more current. Unique to the blogosphere, the 
bloggers in this cluster choose to self-host their sites, as indicated by the domain names of the 
blogs.  
 
UNITED	  ARAB	  EMIRATES	  
There is one UAE cluster (UAE Social English) on the 2014 map, which is populated mostly by 
the expatriate community writing in English about mostly social life in the UAE, sometimes in a 
critical tone. The fact that only an expatriate cluster from the UAE appeared in the blogosphere 
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probably reflects the demographic structure of the UAE, where the expatriate community has 
been officially estimated to be 88% of the population.30  
 
JORDAN	  
Two clusters from Jordan appear in the 2014 blogosphere. Jordan Social & Political includes 
commentary on various social and political issues in the country. The other cluster, Jordan 
Social, focuses attention on social life, observations on individual behavior and societal attitudes 
towards various issues, and family affairs. Writings in both clusters are in Arabic and English. 
 
IRAQ,	  LEBANON,	  AND	  OMAN	  
Only one cluster in the map centers on Iraq appeared in the 2014 map (Iraq English). This 
cluster consists of Iraqis blogging about social issues and, to a lesser extent, political matters. 
The cluster is predominantly in English. Similarly, there is only one cluster from Lebanon 
(Lebanon Political & Social), which is populated by bloggers commenting on local political and 
social issues with some coverage of entertainment news. The cluster is in English. Oman is 
represented by one cluster (Oman Political, Social & Literary), which offers a mixture of 
political commentary on local and regional affairs and reflections on social issues, as well as 
literary criticism and book reviews.  
 
MAGREB	  
North Africa has a relatively small presence in the 2014 Arab blogosphere. Only three clusters 
emerged from the entire region on the 2014 map. One is from Tunisia (Tunisia Political, Social, 
Art); it is a mixture of discussion on various local issues including politics, social matters, art, 
and culture. The postings are in Arabic and French, with some in English. Two other clusters that 
represent voices from the Maghreb offer a mixture of resources related to France and general 
news from the countries of North Africa. 
 
NOTEWORTHY	  OBSERVATIONS	  
	  
PALESTINE	  
We reviewed the discourse on the Arab blogosphere to find if discussion on pan-Arab issues has 
changed since the 2009 study. We chose the dialogue related to Palestine as an example of a 
topic that has traditionally been a significant and central regional concern and because it figured 
prominently in the 2009 study. Compared to our 2009 research on the Arab blogosphere, we 
found that Palestine and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict no longer command the same level of 
attention of bloggers across the Arab world. In reviewing the Arab blogosphere after the July-
August 2014 Israel war on Gaza and found that there was still no significant posting in response 
to the war outside the two clusters in the blogosphere that focus on Palestinian issues. More 
pressing domestic political and social concerns appear to have overshadowed the Palestinian 
                                                
30 UAE National Bureau of Statistics, 
http://www.uaestatistics.gov.ae/ReportPDF/Population%20Estimates%202006%20-%202010.pdf. 
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issue in the Arab blogosphere. Also, Arab users have taken the discourse on the July-August 
Israeli war on Gaza to social media.31 
 
LITERARY	  BLOGGING	  
Literary blogging is spread across many clusters and is often mixed with political and social 
writings. There is also an exclusive community of literary bloggers in the blogosphere that 
includes creative writers and literature lovers. The cluster Literature/Published Authors is 
populated by literary bloggers and published writers featuring their print and digital publications; 
literature appreciators and lovers critiquing literary works; and amateur literary essayists. The 
posts range from opinionated long-form essays to shorter commentary. The discussion is mostly 
devoted to Arabic modern and contemporary literature and has no focus on any specific genre. 
The tone of the blogs tends to be formal, and few adopt a conversational style. The blogs are 
sporadically updated. In contrast, the cluster Literature/Personal Diaries is a community of 
personal diarists using literary and creative writing styles for expression. The cluster Creative 
Writing is mostly unpublished writers showcasing their creative poetry and prose. Most of the 
writing in these clusters is not contextualized or related to specific experiences or events. 
 
THE	  BAHA'I	  COMMUNITY	  
The Baha’i are the only minority faith community to appear in the 2014 Arab blogosphere map; 
they were also present in the 2009 blogosphere study. The cluster (Baha'i/Egypt) consists 
primarily of blogs by Egyptian individuals who self-identify as Baha’i adherents and do not 
mention their names. Although the bloggers do not mention the reasons that they remain 
anonymous, it is possible that they, as a persecuted minority faith, are worried about their ability 
to integrate into the larger society and their access to state services, some of which are apparently 
off limits to them: in January 2013, Egypt’s Minister of Education was quoted by local media as 
saying that Baha'i students cannot enroll in public schools as that violates the constitution 
because Baha'i is not among the faiths recognized by the state.32  
 
ISLAM	  
The Islam cluster is a community of bloggers commenting on personal and social issues with 
emphasis on Islamic religious identity and religious lifestyle. The cluster does not show any 
political tendency; it appears to be a zone for individuals seeking spiritual solace in religion who 
have virtually no interests in religious-based political or social activism. Most of the Muslim 
sheikhs referred to in this community are notably apolitical spiritual leaders. 
 
Another cluster linked to Islam is the Islam Sunni cluster, which is dominated by Muslim 
scholars discussing religious matters with emphasis on the Sunni sect and school of thought. 
There is no indication that these scholars engage in political discourse, however. It is worth 
noting that many of these scholars are linked to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Similar to the Kuwaiti 
Social cluster, the sites in this cluster are self-hosted sites, as indicated by the domain names.  
 
                                                
31 Narratives of Conflict: What the 2014 Gaza War Can Tell Us About Discourse on the Internet, 
https://medium.com/internet-monitor-2014-public-discourse/narratives-of-conflict-what-the-2014-gaza-war-can-tell-
us-about-discourse-on-the-internet-2275163b728b 
32 “Bahais cannot enroll in public schools, education minister says,” Egypt Independent, January 6, 2013, 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/bahais-cannot-enroll-public-schools-education-minister-says. 
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PROFESSIONAL	  BLOGGING	  
One professional blogging cluster appeared on the map (Regional/Professional Blogs). The 
blogs in this cluster are pan-Arab, and they provide an Arabic speaking audience with 
information on technology, how-to advice, marketing strategies, tips on electronic commerce, 
and book reviews. Some of the blogs are advertising-supported. 
 
EGYPTIAN	  TWITTERSPHERE	  MAP	  
The structure of the Egypt Twittersphere reflects the deep political divisions in the country. 
There are three major political clusters: Military-Aligned; Muslim Brotherhood, and Non-
Aligned.33 The unifying theme of the first cluster is support for the Sisi government and more 
generally the role of the military in Egypt public affairs. The Muslim Brotherhood cluster 
includes members of the organization and supporters of the deposed government of Muhammed 
Morsi. The Non-Aligned cluster spans a more diverse set of political perspectives and includes 
left-leaning, self-professed socialists and revolutionaries, libertarians, free speech advocates, and 
reformers, as well as anti-military junta and anti-Islamic theocracy voices. The common ground 
that brings together the users in this cluster is a rejection of both the Sisi and Morsi 
governments.  A fourth large cluster in the network covers users that are not defined by their 
political affiliation but rather by their interest in Social and Cultural issues. A fifth cluster, 
Media, Politics & Entertainment, includes accounts that bridge different sets of interests. The 
map also reveals how each network is connected to other political groups outside of Egypt as 
manifest by the presence of state and non-state actors from other countries in the region who are 
aligned with each network overall theme. 
 
                                                
33 The network mapping renders a map with 35 clusters. However, for this network map, the most meaningful 
distinction between the various groups of users in this network occurs across an aggregation of five larger groups of 
users.  The differences between the algorithmically determined clusters within these five groups are nearly 
indistinguishable and minor compared to the differences across the five large groups in the network. The 
comparative analysis is therefore carried out at this larger level, and for simplicity, we refer to the five higher level 
aggregations as clusters.   
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Figure	  6:	  Egyptian	  Twitter	  Map 
 
The clear articulation of political poles in this network provides evidence of the increase in 
political polarization in Egypt that has taken root over the past several years.  
 
MILITARY-­‐ALIGNED	  CLUSTER	  
This cluster is populated by users who assert their support of the military and President Sisi, the 
former head of the military and current president of Egypt. It is common in this cluster for users 
to express their pride in being Egyptian in their profile description. Many describe themselves as 
nationalist. The use of photos of Sisi on their profiles is frequent. The discourse in this cluster is 
primarily centered around political affairs in Egypt, specifically shedding positive light on Sisi’s 
activities, speeches, and initiatives along with government programs. Users also post content 
critical of Sisi’s local opponents, such as activists, journalists, and international critics such as 
the president of Turkey and the state of Qatar (both have reportedly exhibited support for the 
Muslim Brotherhood). Many of the accounts use what sound like real Arabic names; few of the 
profile names in this cluster are obvious pseudonyms. The clusters also include accounts with the 
names of public figures such as politicians, journalists, actors, and celebrities. These accounts 
have not necessarily been verified as belonging to these prominent figures. This cluster also 
includes the accounts of security organizations such as the police department 
(@EgyptianPolice0) and the spokesperson of the military (@EgyArmySpox). These accounts 
disseminate state narratives on various security incidents. They are often retweeted by others in 
the cluster.  
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Figure	  7:	  Military-­‐Aligned	  and	  Pro-­‐Government	  Cluster 
 
Users in the military-aligned cluster celebrate Sisi on occasions such as the first anniversary of 
him taking office34 and apolitical occasions such as the holiday month of Ramadan, when users 
launched the hashtag “Ramadan is better with Sisi [as president]” (translation from Arabic). 
Users in this cluster also promote government projects that have been initiated under the Sisi 
regime. One project that received significant coverage is the New Suez Canal, a project 
undertaken by the government that was started in 2014. It will run alongside the existing 145-
year-old canal and is expected to open in August 2015.35 The project was widely celebrated by 
users and described as “Egypt’s pride.” Citizens were urged to follow a Twitter account for the 
Canal.36 
 
Users also actively promote media stories and reports that highlight human rights practices in 
Egypt in a positive context. For example, a user retweeted a story with the headline: 
“International Labor Organization: Egypt witnesses notable progress in workers’ conditions.”37 
                                                
34 Elebrashy News, Twitter post, Jun 8, 2015, 4:12 PM,  
https://twitter.com/WaelElebrashy/status/608049012428652544. 
35 Reuters, Egypt prepares to open new Suez Canal to run alongside the existing 145-year-old waterway, Jun 14, 
2015, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-14/egypt-gets-ready-to-open-new-suez-canal/6544430 
36 Abeer, Twitter post, Jun 13, 2015, 10:17 AM https://twitter.com/abero86/status/609771537865003008. 
37 Youm7, Twitter post, Jun 11, 2015, 6:35 AM, https://twitter.com/youm7/status/608990949092507649. 
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Users in this cluster are engaged in information campaigns and counter-campaigns against 
groups represented in the other two political clusters, including the Muslim Brotherhood and 
activists from the largely secular groups that have participated in the demonstrations that led to 
the January 2011 revolution that removed President Hosni Mubarak from power. Supporters of 
Sisi express their approval of the restrictions imposed by the government against these two 
groups. One tweet, for example, demands that the government must stop what it called “foreign 
funding” from reaching the April 6 Movement,38 a youth activist group that helped to organize 
and promote the 2011 protests. Users in this cluster also defend the state’s measures against 
political opponents and refute reports produced by the local and international human rights 
organizations on Egypt’s human rights practices. One for example tweeted: “[Forget] 
international opinion, human right watch and activists opinion...crackdown, and let 'em feel you. 
#Egypt”39 Another describes Human Rights Watch reports on Egypt as "suspicious" and 
"promoting lies."40 
 
Various campaigns against the Muslim Brotherhood continue to emerge in this cluster, with 
hashtags such as “Cleanse Egypt’s institutions from Muslim Brotherhood” (translation from 
Arabic).  
 
Users in the military-aligned cluster often compare Sisi to former President Mohammed Morsi in 
a way that is meant to celebrate Sisi and defame Morsi. For example, when Sisi visited Germany 
in June 2015, users posted two photos. One shows Sisi in a joint press conference with German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel while she is smiling at him; the other shows then-president Morsi—
also in a joint press conference with Merkel—but with Merkel looking bored instead of 
smiling.41 The Arabic caption reads: “Sisi’s shyness adds dignity to him; the foolishness of 
Morsi makes those who elected him more foolish.” 
 
                                                
38 Nancy, Twitter post, Jun 11, 2015, 6:23 AM, https://twitter.com/nancykhaliill/status/608987991034318849. 
39 Polly_Purebred, Twitter post, Jun 10, 2015, 2:30 AM, 
https://twitter.com/Polly_Purebred_/status/608566849001943040. 
40 Mohamed Abu Hamed, Twitter post, Jun 9, 2015, 1:49 AM, 
https://twitter.com/MohamedAbuHamed/status/608194255266435072. 
41 Hoooooos, Twitter post, Jun 3, 2015, 6:05 AM, https://twitter.com/7ossamrasslan/status/606084292540829696. 
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Figure	  8:	  Tweet	  reads,	  “Sisi’s	  shyness	  adds	  dignity	  to	  him;	  the	  foolishness	  of	  Morsi	  makes	  those	  who	  elected	  him	  
more	  foolish.” 
 
Unlike our first review of this network map in the fall of 2014,42 we find in the spring of 2015 
that the users in the military-aligned cluster have started to quote or retweet tweets from their 
rival clusters along with critical comments or refutations. For example, a user retweeted a 
statement from the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) that said, “FJP 
strongly condemns heinous attacks in #Luxor & its perpetrators. holds mil coup gov't responsible 
for the fast deteriorating security.” The user added the comment, “you are a bunch of liars.”43 
 
Users in the military-aligned cluster disseminate government statements, especially those critical 
of foreign governments that criticize the Sisi government over its human rights record. For 
example, many users tweeted and celebrated a statement from Egypt’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs urging United States authorities to “practice caution in dealing with the protesters in 
Ferguson, Missouri.” Users attached to the statement photos showing confrontation between the 
police and the protesters and photos showing violence from the riots. The wording of the 
statement seemed to echo language used by Washington to caution Cairo in dealing with Islamist 
                                                
42 Initial review of the Twitter maps started in the winter of 2013 and initial review of blogosphere map started in 
winter of 2014. Additional reviews were conducted in spring and fall of 2014 and final review in spring of 2015. 
43 Nancy, Twitter post, Jun 10, 2015, 5:46 AM, https://twitter.com/nancykhaliill/status/608616216727572481 
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protesters.44 The Arabic caption reads: “We ask the American police to please use self-restraint. 
Let’s tweet this, tweeple.”45 
 
 
Figure	  9:	  Tweet	  reads,	  “We	  ask	  the	  American	  police	  to	  please	  use	  self-­‐restraint.	  Let’s	  tweet	  this,	  tweeple.” 
 
One recurrent topic that appears frequently in the military-aligned clusters is suspicion of the al-
Noor Party, despite the party’s support of Sisi and the apparent acceptance of the party by the 
government. Although it is affiliated with the Salafi movement, which is based in Sunni Islam, 
the al-Noor Party sides with Sisi instead of the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, one user posts 
what looks like a clipping from an Arabic newspaper printing the headline “al-Noor Party cadre 
meets 5 CIA officers.” The user comments: “be cautious of al-Noor Party; apparently they 
introduce themselves as alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood.”46 
 
Users that support the military frequently express their approval of the government’s foreign 
policies. For example, many accounts supported the government’s participation in the Saudi-led 
military intervention in Yemen,47 and frame the Egyptian government’s decision to support 
                                                
44 John Hall, “American Spring? Now Egypt puts the boot in as it urges U.S. authorities to 'exercise restraint' in 
dealing with Missouri riots,” Daily Mail, August 19, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2728831/American-Spring-Now-Egypt-puts-boot-urges-U-S-authorities-exercise-restraint-dealing-Missouri-
riots.html. 
45 Misriya bint elnil, Twitter post, Apr 28, 2015, 7:34 AM, 
https://twitter.com/samsouma2012/status/593060707308019712. 
46 Maria, Twitter post, Jun 5, 2015, 3:00 AM, https://twitter.com/mariaqueen100/status/606762587796172800. 
47 Amr Adib, Twitter post, Mar 26, 2015, 8:44 AM, 
https://twitter.com/Amradib/status/581119653835104257. 
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Saudi Arabia as part of returning the favor of supporting Sisi against the Muslim Brotherhood.48 
Anti-Iran rhetoric49 became visible in this cluster after the government decision to support the 
Saudi-led airstrikes in Yemen against the Houthi rebels, who have been accused of being a proxy 
for Iran. 
 
MUSLIM	  BROTHERHOOD	  FOCUS	  CLUSTER	  
 
Figure	  10:	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  Cluster 
 
This cluster is populated primarily by users who declare their affiliation with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, many of whom display the Rabia sign on their profile pictures. Many users in the 
cluster emphasize their Islamic identity. One user, for example, describes himself as a “Muslim 
apologist.”50 There are also users who say they are not members of the Muslim Brotherhood but 
support them51 and users to who do not declare any position on the group. The cluster includes 
inactive accounts belonging to key Muslim Brotherhood leaders who have been imprisoned after 
the group was ousted from power. Examples include the account of one of the group’s senior 
leaders Essam Elerian.52 The cluster also includes several accounts of non-Egyptian political 
                                                
48 Amr Adib, Twitter post, Mar 26, 2015, 7:56 AM, https://twitter.com/Amradib/status/581107529515708417. 
49 Example Amr Dib, Twitter post, Mar 26, 2015, 8:01 AM, 
https://twitter.com/Amradib/status/581108818572107776. 
50 @FadelSoliman, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/FadelSoliman. 
51 @hala_moo, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/hala_moo. 
52 @Essam_Elerian, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/Essam_Elerian. 
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figures known for their support of the group and for criticism of the Sisi government, such as the 
account of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey.53 
 
The discourse in this cluster frequently focuses on the removal of the government of Mohammed 
Morsi from power in 2013. The deposition of Morsi is described by Muslim Brotherhood 
supporters as a military coup led by Sisi, who was Minister of Defense at the time. Morsi was 
elected in 2012 in an election that is widely recognized as open and fair. Twitter users in this 
cluster also focus attention on issues such as economic grievances, unemployment, and social 
injustice under the Sisi government, stressing complaints that have public appeal such as 
disseminating photos showing long lines of citizens desperately waiting for cooking gas 
cylinders.54 The Arabic caption reads:  
 
Egypt got a half billion dollar loan from the World Bank to make cooking gas 
cylinders available 
Where are the cylinders? Not there 
Ok, where is the loan? Not there 
Yet, [we say] Go Egypt.55 
 
 
Figure	  11:	  Tweet	  reads,	  “Egypt	  got	  a	  half	  billion	  dollar	  loan	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  to	  make	  cooking	  gas	  cylinders	  
available	  Where	  are	  the	  cylinders?	  Not	  there	  Ok,	  where	  is	  the	  loan?	  Not	  there	  Yet,	  [we	  say]	  Go	  Egypt.” 
 
Banned and persecuted in Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood members use Twitter as a parallel and 
alternative space for political opposition activities. Members and sympathizers highlight their 
political grievances as well as the vulnerabilities of the Sisi government. Users in this cluster 
                                                
53 @RecepT_Erdogan, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/RecepT_Erdogan. 
54 Anas Elgendy, Twitter post, Jun 6, 2015, 4:30 PM, https://twitter.com/as043861/status/607328781410443264. 
55 Dr. Samaha, Twitter post, Mar 15, 2015, 3:20 PM, https://twitter.com/drsamah/status/577232844487057408. 
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often discuss Egypt’s “poor” record on freedom of speech and human rights since Sisi became 
president. It is not uncommon for users in this cluster to cite Western media outlets and 
disseminate reports that are critical of the Sisi government issued by secular and West-based 
organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. 
 
Outside of local issues, users in these clusters often express concern about Muslims in other 
countries, especially Muslim minority groups, such as the Rohingya, who face persecution in 
Burma. The Rohingya have been the center of a humanitarian crisis as tens of thousands have 
fled persecution. Raising the visibility of such groups and offering prayers for them is not 
uncommon in these clusters.56 
 
Responding to tweets from Sisi loyalists who supported the Saudi-led coalition to restore the 
“legitimate president of Yemen,” users in the Muslim Brotherhood clusters remind the loyalists 
that there is a “legitimate” president (i.e., Morsi) imprisoned in Egypt and facing the death 
penalty. 
 
Muslim Brotherhood cluster members critically comment on Sisi’s political activities, at times 
seeming to match rival activities in the military-aligned cluster. One user posted a caricature 
from a German publication during Sisi’s June 2015 visit showing him walking side by side with 
Chancellor Merkel to the red carpet with what looks like blood-soaked footsteps. Users often 
retweet posts from a President Sisi parody account, which posts news and comments on various 
political and social issues, including arrests of activists, from the point of view of an imagined, 
ironic, sarcastic version of Sisi.57 
 
 
Figure	  12:	  Tweet	  reads,	  “German	  political	  satirist	  magazine	  Cicero:	  Mr	  Sisi.	  Stand	  as	  long	  as	  you	  can	  on	  the	  red	  
carpet	  so	  that	  no	  one	  will	  see	  the	  traces	  of	  your	  feet.” 
                                                
56 See for example Fadel Soliman, Twitter post, Jun 6, 2015, 4:43 AM, 
https://twitter.com/FadelSoliman/status/607150833072021504. 
57 Abdelfattah Alsisi, Twitter post, May 15, 2015, 6:28 PM, https://twitter.com/alsiisii/status/599385857770934272. 
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Users in the Muslim Brotherhood cluster are also critical of the al-Noor Party, which sides with 
Sisi rather than the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. One tweet, for example, says “The coup will 
not abandon al-Noor party because it [the coup] cleans its hands which are full with blood on the 
beards [of the party members].”58 
 
NON-­‐ALIGNED	  CLUSTER	  
 
Figure	  13:	  Non-­‐Aligned	  Cluster 
 
Users in the Non-Aligned59 cluster include local human rights advocates,60 political reformers, 
and digital rights activists,61 including figures who were associated with  Egypt’s 2011 
revolution such as Wael Ghonim (@ghonim), Alaa Abd El Fattah (@alaa), and Nawara Negm 
(@nawaranegm). Inactive accounts of activists who have been arrested appear in this cluster, for 
                                                
58 Mawqi Dr. Mohammed al-Jawady, Twitter post, Feb 3, 2015, 1:36 AM, 
https://twitter.com/gawadyat/status/562545169615302657. 
59 The label non-aligned is meant to signal that users in this cluster are critical of both the Sisi government and that 
of former president Morsi. It is not meant to suggest that users in this cluster do not have their own political 
viewpoints or do not support other political movements and organizations. 
60 For example, https://twitter.com/gamaleid. 
61 For example, https://twitter.com/RamyRaoof. 
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example the account of Ahmed Douma (@ahmeddouma), a prominent activist who received a 
life sentence in February 2015 for “rioting, inciting violence and attacking security forces in late 
2011.”62 Many users are from self-professed liberal and left-leaning backgrounds (e.g., the 
Socialist Revolutionists63 and the Revolutionary Socialists64). 
 
In addition to taking political positions, users in these clusters tweet about a variety of apolitical 
issues from around the world. English is used more frequently in the non-aligned cluster and 
users here are more likely to cite Western media. In the most recent review of this cluster in the 
spring of 2015, political tweets are less frequent, compared to a similar review in the fall of 
2014. 
 
Users in these clusters are critical of what they call the “military regime” and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. One for example introduces himself in the profile as “against the military regime 
and the Muslim Brotherhood.”65 
 
Although criticism of Islamist groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, continues in this 
cluster, the focus has shifted to protesting what the users consider repressive measures taken by 
the Sisi government against political activists, advocacy groups, the media, and both local and 
international NGOs. Many users express disappointment with what they consider deterioration of 
human rights after the “coup.” As one user puts it, “Seems like the coup created a secular 
caliphate in Egypt.”66 
 
The non-aligned cluster is where arrests of activists and journalists from all backgrounds are 
most frequently discussed, with special attention paid to the activists who participated in the 
political activities that led to the January 2011 protests and have been imprisoned since then by 
the Sisi government. Users often tweet news about specific incidents of individuals who have 
gone missing or been arrested by the security forces. A June 2015 tweet for example reported: 
”Over the past week, 11 activists have been reported missing or allegedly kidnapped by security 
forces in #Egypt.”67 Users in this cluster also report news about the government crackdown on 
human rights advocacy groups. One user, for example, tweeted about the government starting an 
investigation into the Cairo Center for Human Rights Studies after the center criticized Egypt’s 
human rights record in a European Parliament hearing.68 Users also report on major restrictive 
measures against civic groups and media organizations. One post states, “Weekend recap from 
Egypt: Ultras banned, Reem Magued's new program taken off air, Morsi, 100+ others sentenced 
to death. So much stability.”69 (Ultras are football fan leagues that also engage in politically 
oriented activities; Reem Magued is a TV presenter whose program on women's issues was 
suspended by its broadcaster satellite channel ONTV). Users in the non-aligned cluster also 
highlight what they call the “humanitarian catastrophe” faced by political detainees “due to 
                                                
62 “Egyptian court sends activist Ahmed Douma to jail for life,” Reuters, February 4, 2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/04/us-egypt-activist-idUSKBN0L81DI20150204. 
63 @RevSocMe, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/RevSocMe. 
64 @Gsquare86, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/Gsquare86. 
65 @Elmoshir, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/Elmoshir. 
66 Karl Sharro, Twitter post, Dec 8, 2014, 10:17 AM, https://twitter.com/KarlreMarks/status/542020215857750017. 
67 Farah Saafan, Twitter post, Jun 3, 2015, 5:54 AM, https://twitter.com/FarahSaafan/status/606081578788392960 
68 Sarah El Sirgany, Twitter post, Jun 10, 2015, 8:04 AM, https://twitter.com/Ssirgany/status/608651039634546688. 
69 Dalia Ezzat, Twitter post, May 16, 2015, 4:06 AM, https://twitter.com/DaliaEzzat_/status/599531481762013184. 
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medical negligence”70 as well as torture practices by the Egyptian police.71 Some users reject the 
death sentences of Muslim Brotherhood leaders, saying that even political rivals deserve 
justice.72 
 
Hashtag campaigns to free activists and journalists are common in this cluster, e.g., Freedom to 
#Yusuf Shaban; Freedom to #Mahinour el Masry”73 (Shaban is a journalist and el Masry is an 
activist; both were arrested by security forces). There are also reports about confrontations 
between activists and supporters of el-Sisi offline. A user for example posted a photo with the 
caption, “This Sisi lover came and threw rocks at the press syndicate dispersing the stand.and she 
kept throwing rocks.”74 However, we found no instances of organized campaigns for activists to 
take to the streets to protest the arrest of activists or journalists; an anti-protest law bans 
demonstrations without prior permission from the police. A June 2015 presidential decision to 
pardon 165 detainees who had been jailed for violating the anti-protest law75 received little 
attention in this cluster, and the few who commented on it were critical of the pardon.  One user 
writes: “Congratulations to the released ones but why did the pardon include only Muslim 
Brotherhood loyalists and not the revolution supporters. The regime hates and fears them 
because they are sincere, brave and have no personal ambitions.”76 
 
A distinct set of users in this cluster consists of Egyptian bloggers posting primarily in English 
about local political and social affairs. Egyptian and Western media and journalists covering 
Egyptian political news can also be found in this cluster. 
 
                                                
70 Tahrir Berlin, Twitter post, Jun 1, 2015, 2:40 AM, https://twitter.com/TahrirBerlin/status/605307826882379776. 
71 al-Ishtrakiyoon al-Thawriyoun, Twitter post, Jun 12, 2015, 9:01 AM, 
https://twitter.com/RevSocMe/status/609390072333488128. 
72 Alaa Aswany, Twitter post, May 20, 2015, 5:23 PM, 
https://twitter.com/AlaaAswany/status/601181498205675520. 
73 Bahaa (Bebo), Twitter post, May 31, 2015, 7:28 AM, 
https://twitter.com/BahaaEltawel/status/605018127773089792. 
74 Gigi Ibrahim, Twitter post, Jun 1, 2015, 8:47 AM, https://twitter.com/Gsquare86/status/605400267232817152. 
75 Heba Afify, “Anti-Protest Law campaigners say Ramadan pardons are not enough,” Mada Masr, June 17, 2015, 
http://www.madamasr.com/sections/politics/anti-protest-law-campaigners-say-ramadan-pardons-are-not-enough. 
76 Alaa Aswany, Twitter post, Jun 18, 2015, 5:11 PM, https://twitter.com/AlaaAswany/status/611687749272358912. 
 28 
SOCIAL	  AND	  CULTURAL	  CLUSTER	  
 
Figure	  14:	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Cluster 
 
The non-political portion of the Egyptian Twitter map is comprised of users who discuss 
personal and cultural issues. This cluster is populated largely by teenagers and young people who 
often talk about issues associated with their generation, performance in school, and future 
ambitions. The discourse also includes entertainment and literary topics. In the most recent 
review of this cluster, we found instances of political commentary seeping into the discourse, 
often with a critical but humorous tone. Some comments are leveled at Sisi, but they are mostly 
comical and do not amount to political opposition. One, for example, writes “Hey guys, I have 
not started writing about politics and all of a sudden a police car is following me on the ring road 
asking me to pull over :)).”77  
 
                                                
77 MOLY, Twitter post, Nov 8, 2014, 7:45 AM, https://twitter.com/MoLY_HaNeM/status/531110391309692928. 
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MEDIA,	  POLITICS	  &	  ENTERTAINMENT	  CLUSTER	  
 
Figure	  15:	  Media,	  Politics	  &	  Entertainment	  Cluster 
 
The Media, Politics & Entertainment cluster is comprised of users that represent different 
sectors. It includes prominent politicians, TV presenters, actors, entertainers, and sports 
personalities. Some of the entertainers are also engaged in political activity; this group includes 
the movie director Khaled Youssef (@khaledyoussef_1) and political satirist Bassem Youssef 
(@DrBassemYoussef). Former president Muhammed Morsi and former presidential candidate 
Mohamed ElBaradei (@ElBaradei) both appear in this cluster, as does Barack Obama.  
 
The discourse is mixed, ranging from commentary on Egyptian political and social topics to the 
discussion of TV programs, movies, and personal experience. This cluster appears to provide a 
partial but weak bridge across the highly polarized political communities in Egypt.  
 
REGIONAL	  DIMENSIONS	  OF	  EGYPTIAN	  POLITICAL	  CLUSTERS	  
A significant number of non-Egyptian users appear in the three political clusters, highlighting the 
regional and international followers of these different political groups. The Military-Aligned 
cluster includes accounts from the Gulf region that showed support for the removal of Morsi 
from power and continue to support Sisi. Examples include the account of the Head of General 
Security for the Emirate of Dubai Dhahi Khalfan (@Dhahi_Khalfan), who is known for his anti-
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Muslim Brotherhood tweets. In one tweet, for example, he describes the Brotherhood as “very 
stupid.”78 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood cluster includes accounts of Islamists and sympathizers from the 
region. A set of prominent Muslim clerics from the Gulf countries whose followers are in the 
millions are in this cluster, including Mohamad Alarefe (@MohamadAlarefe, 12.1 million 
followers), Aaidh Alqarnee (@Dr_alqarnee, 9.45 million), Salman Alodah (@salman_alodah, 
9.34 million), and Nabil Alawadhy (@NabilAlawadhy, 6.11 million). 
 
The Non-Aligned cluster is more highly integrated with Western audiences, especially media 
that have been covering local human rights issues such as state restrictions on activities of human 
rights organizations and civil society. The Western media that appear in this cluster are more 
highly engaged with Egyptian bloggers who write in English.  
 
The Social and Cultural cluster is less integrated with users outside of Egypt, although there are 
links with scattered like-minded individuals in the region. 
 
REGROUPING	  ONLINE	  
The Twittersphere in Egypt has emerged as a space for campaigns and counter campaigns 
between the competing political rivals in Egypt. The government actors and loyalists to Sisi 
government compete on the online space to promote the government policies, amplify state 
viewpoints, and criticize oppositional voices.  
 
The Egyptian authorities banned the Muslim Brotherhood in September 2013 after president 
Morsi was ousted from power and a court upheld a ruling banning the group in November 
2013.79 Twitter serves as a parallel space for the Muslim Brotherhood to air its political 
grievances against the regime and to voice dissident views that are now restricted offline in 
Egypt. The group harnesses unfettered access to Twitter in Egypt to sustain its voice in 
opposition to the government.  
 
Supporters of a civilian government continue to oppose both the military-aligned government 
and Islamists. They too maintain political protests on Twitter as a law enacted in November 2013 
restricts street protests. Article 8 of the law states that: “Anyone wanting to organize a public 
meeting, march or protest must notify in writing the police station whose jurisdiction includes 
the public meeting's location or the starting point of a march or protest, the notification must be 
given in a minimum of three working days prior to the public meeting, march or protest ….”80 
The law requires protesters to submit to government authorities information about the location 
and subject of the march or protest, and names and addresses of the organizing individuals or 
organizations. Twitter has become an alternative space for civil society actors who oppose 
restrictions to freedom to assembly to protest the law itself and to campaign for the release of 
activists who have been arrested for presumably violated this law. These actors also use Twitter 
                                                
78 Dhahi Khalfan Tamim, Twitter post, Jun 7, 2015, 7:18 PM, 
https://twitter.com/Dhahi_Khalfan/status/607733364024483840. 
79 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/11/egypt-court-upholds-muslim-brotherhood-ban-
2013116101936365849.html 
80 Full English translation of Egypt's new protest law, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/87375.aspx 
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as a virtual civil society space to highlight human rights violations and freedom of speech 
restrictions. In Egypt, as offline protests are actively suppressed by the government, online 
spaces are again the center of social mobilization.  
BAHRAIN	  TWITTERSPHERE	  
 
Figure	  16:	  Bahrain	  Twittersphere	  Map 
 
The mapping of discourse on Twitter in Bahrain reflects a nation divided across political and 
religious lines. The structure of the Bahraini Twitter map also reveals interesting and rich layers 
of detail. It not only shows the overall political and social divisions and tendencies in the 
country, but also highlights the variety within each of political groups, and the regional players 
and added dimensions of the discourse associated with each group.  
 
The debates on Twitter in Bahrain are fueled by the use of pseudonymous accounts to express 
unpopular political or religious sectarian sentiments. This practice is prevalent on both sides of 
the debates.  
 
The Bahraini network on Twitter is structured into four major groups with a focus on political 
issues, each of which is comprised of a number of clusters: the Bahraini Royal & Sunni Group, 
the Bahraini Shia & Opposition Group, the Regional Royal & Sunni Supporters Group, and 
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the Regional Shia & Opposition Supporters Group. A fifth group comprised primarily of 
media organizations is cited by accounts from both sides. 
 
BAHRAINI	  ROYAL	  &	  SUNNI	  GROUP	  
 
Figure	  17:	  Bahrain	  Royal	  &	  Sunni	  Group 
 
The Bahrain Royal & Sunni Group is made up of eight clusters comprised of individuals and 
institutions that are affiliated with or supportive of the current rulers in Bahrain. The users are 
sometimes critical of the government, but not of the regime. 
 
Four closely related clusters are populated by journalists, politicians, parliamentarians, and 
private citizens, along with accounts used for Twitter information campaigns. These accounts 
typically discuss local political and social issues in Bahrain as well as news from the region. 
There is particular emphasis on countries where there are political or armed conflicts, such as 
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, and most recently Yemen. While discussion covers considerable 
political ground, one distinct feature of these clusters is that many of the users post news and 
views that are supportive of the monarchy and critical of the opposition. The clusters include 
pseudonymous accounts dedicated almost entirely to “defending” Bahrain81 and to criticizing the 
                                                
81 Example https://twitter.com/ElaAlBa7rain 
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opposition. These accounts often use religiously demeaning terms82 and terms linking them to 
Iran, such as “Iran’s mercenaries.”83 For example, when Hizbullah’s Secretary General Hassan 
Nasrallah called his Shiite rivals in Lebanon “Shiites of the U.S. Embassy” and labeled them 
“traitors, collaborators and idiots,”84 users in these clusters posted a photo allegedly showing a 
Bahraini Shiite leader meeting with the US Ambassador in Bahrain,85 implying that Nasrallah’s 
description applies to the Bahraini Shiite leader.  
 
Users in these clusters express support for campaigns against Shiite groups in the region that are 
perceived as threats. For example, users support the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen 
against the Shiite rebels known as Houthis, with many portraying the conflict as having a 
religious dimension, saying the war against Houthis is in defense of the Holy Mosque in 
Mecca.86  
 
On the other hand, some users describe the conflict between Sunnis and Shiite as purely political, 
not sectarian, and support protection of their citizenship rights.87 In this context, many users 
condemned the bombing of a Shiite Mosque in Kuwait that killed 27 people in June 2015. 
 
A separate set of four clusters in this group with similar users and content engage in stronger 
Sunni rhetoric. A higher proportion of accounts in these clusters use obvious Arabic 
pseudonyms. One account for example describes its objective as "Defending the Sunni 
community and exposing the Rafida”88 (a defamatory term for Shiites). Other examples include 
the Private Network to Defend Sunni Community (@Al3AMEED_70) and the Bahrain Defense 
Group (@BHRdefense). These accounts often commend the Sunni belief system and criticize 
Shiite doctrines. 
 
                                                
82 @7areghum, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/7areghum. 
83 Mohammed Khalid Boammar, Twitter post, Jun 25, 2015, 6:53 PM, 
https://twitter.com/boammar/status/614250175884689409. 
84 “Everyone has role to play in 'existential' Syria battle: Nasrallah,” The Daily Star, May 23, 2015, 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/May-23/299087-everyone-has-role-to-play-in-existential-
syria-battle-nasrallah.ashx. 
85 Muwatin Khaliji, Twitter post, May 28, 2015, 11:58 AM, 
https://twitter.com/Lion_King_Bhr/status/603998905211060224. 
86 Amani Alabsi, Twitter post, Mar 31, 2015, 8:12 AM, 
https://twitter.com/amanialabsi/status/582923375082754049. 
87 Mohammed al-Othman, Twitter post, Jun 27, 2015 2:31 AM, 
https://twitter.com/m_alothman/status/614727677430231044. 
88 @bahraindefence, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/bahraindefence. 
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Figure	  18:	  Users	  in	  Bahraini	  loyalist	  clusters	  posted	  a	  photo	  allegedly	  showing	  a	  Bahraini	  Shiite	  figure	  with	  the	  US	  
Ambassador	  in	  Bahrain.	  The	  photo	  was	  posted	  after	  Hizbullah’s	  leader	  criticized	  his	  Shiite	  rivals	  for	  being	  “Shiites	  
of	  the	  US	  Embassy.” 
 
BAHRAINI	  OPPOSITION	  &	  SHIA	  GROUP	  
 
Figure	  19:	  Bahraini	  Opposition	  &	  Shia	  Group 
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This group includes 11 clusters of individuals, groups, and organizations opposing the monarchy. 
Two related clusters are populated by opposition groups, leaders, and activists. Some of the 
accounts in these clusters describe themselves as representatives of the revolution against the 
monarchy in Bahrain89 and say their mission is to remove the Bahraini regime.90 The clusters 
also include accounts of prominent Bahraini human rights activists such as Nabeel Rajab 
(@NABEELRAJAB). The users disseminate information about alleged arrests and torture of 
Bahraini state opponents91 and often call for political demonstrations against the state92 and post 
photos of protest events. Several accounts are dedicated to campaigns to free jailed opposition 
leaders.93 The use of Shiite rhetoric is common in these clusters.  
 
Four clusters in this group contain accounts that focus on grassroots-level activism and location-
specific news at the village94 and municipality levels,95 and include youth-led activist groups.96 
The use of Shiite rhetoric is strong in these clusters, and many accounts use profile names that 
are obvious pseudonyms. Two additional clusters with similar users and content contain more 
human rights activists and lawyers, whose online activities are dedicated to exposing what they 
call the regime’s violence against dissidents and calling for legal representation to defend the 
victims of such violence. 
 
Regional issues are occasionally discussed, especially topics related to other Shiite groups. A 
number of users express support for the Yemeni Shiite Houthi rebel movement and its leaders, 
despite the fact that Bahrain is part of the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthis. In June 2015, 
a court in Bahrain sentenced a political opposition leader to 5 years in prison for tweeting 
comments critical of Bahrain's participation in the coalition.97  
                                                
89 Examples: https://twitter.com/14FebTV; https://twitter.com/BaniJamrah_News; and 
https://twitter.com/COALITION14. 
90 @MahazzaMedia, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/MahazzaMedia. 
91 Broken Angel, Twitter post, Aug 10, 2014, 12:34 AM, 
https://twitter.com/BrokenAngeL077/status/498371862313725954. 
92 Mohamed Ali Altal, Twitter post, Jun 12, 2015, 2:38 PM, 
https://twitter.com/mohdaltal/status/609474914056278016. 
93 Example: https://twitter.com/BAHRAINDOCTOR. 
94 Example: https://twitter.com/alkawarahnews. 
95 Example: https://twitter.com/juffair14media. 
96 @DurazYouth, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/DurazYouth. 
97al-Rai Media, “al-Bahrain: al-sijn khams sanawat lisiyasi muared bisabab tagridah hawl al-yaman”, Bahrain: 5-
year prison sentence for a political opponent over a tweet about Yemen, 
http://www.alraimedia.com/Articles.aspx?id=602834 Jun 28, 2015, [Arabic] 
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REGIONAL	  ROYAL	  &	  SUNNI	  SUPPORTERS	  GROUP	  
 
Figure	  20:	  Regional	  Royal	  &	  Sunni	  Supporters	  Group 
 
Regional clusters aligned with the state have an extended presence in the form of 6 clusters that 
are populated by non-Bahrain users who express support for the Bahraini state and criticize the 
opposition, usually with a sectarian slant. Some of these clusters have content that appeals to 
Sunnis in general but do not proactively support the monarchy in Bahrain. The users come from 
Sunni communities mostly in the Gulf countries. 
 
Accounts in the Gulf Islam cluster include Muslim clerics from the Arab Gulf countries and 
Arab political commentators tweeting about religious issues in relation to politics in the region. 
A Gulf media cluster is comprised of accounts of media outlets, journalists, and celebrities from 
the region, including Bahrain, posting news and views on current affairs in the region. 
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Three clusters are populated by accounts from the Gulf states, which includes Bahrain. They tend 
to tweet Sunni Islam religious texts, most of which are generic in nature and do not address 
specific events or issues. They also post commentary on various cultural aspects on their 
societies, such as behavior, values, and beliefs. A large proportion of a mixed cluster of accounts 
from the Arab Gulf countries focus on social media marketing. There are also accounts tweeting 
content about sports, poetry, and culture, which have general appeal to Arab speakers from the 
region. 
 
REGIONAL	  SHIA	  &	  OPPOSITION	  SUPPORTERS	  GROUP	  
 
Figure	  21:	  Regional	  Shia	  &	  Opposition	  Supporters	  Group 
 
Like the loyalists group, this network has a regional non-Bahraini dimension in the form of seven 
distinctively Shiite clusters that consist of users expressing sympathy with the opposition 
movement in Bahrain, often along sectarian lines. Some of these clusters have content that 
attracts Shiites in general but do not proactively support the opposition in Bahrain. 
 
One cluster is populated by accounts of Shiite leaders from Saudi Arabia such as Hasan Al-
Nemer (@alnemernet); pseudonymous accounts promoting grievances of Shiites in the Kingdom 
such as “The Frees of Qatif” (@qatifpower) and “Revolution in Sharqia” (@Sharqiyah) (Eastern 
Province), which are areas with Shiite concentration; users discussing what they call the anti-
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Shiite environment in Saudi Arabia (one example cited was in academia);98 and accounts of 
Saudis critical of what they consider Saudi Arabia’s sponsorship of Wahhabism.99 The cluster 
also includes Saudi accounts with broader interests and several Shiite individuals and 
organizations from the region. Mentions of Shiite grievances in Bahrain occasionally feature in 
this cluster. Two additional clusters are populated by accounts from Iraq, Kuwait, and Lebanon, 
along with many accounts that do not mention specific locations. These accounts tweet religious 
Shiite texts, prayers, songs, and poetry that do not address specific events, and are similar to 
literature posted by Shiites in Bahrain. There is little commentary on political and social issues in 
these clusters. Another cluster is devoted to Kuwaiti politics and social affairs. It is populated 
predominantly by accounts from Kuwait, most of which discuss local political affairs. Some of 
the accounts belong to self-professed Kuwaiti Shiite individuals or organizations, with discussion 
focusing primarily on issues related to the Shiite community there. 
 
 
BRIDGE	  GROUP	  
 
Figure	  22:	  Bridge	  Group 
 
                                                
98 Fuad Ibrahim, Twitter post, May 30, 2015, 12:50 PM, 
https://twitter.com/fuadibrahim2011/status/604736570080555008. 
99 Hamza al-Hassan, Twitter post, Jun 17, 2015, 2:22 AM, 
https://twitter.com/hamzaalhassan/status/611101639467003904 
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The map includes seven clusters from the region with religious, political, and/or cultural 
relevance to the clusters in the Bahrain map. 
 
A cluster in this group contains several government media sources such as the Ministry of 
Interior (@moi_bahrain) and government officials such as the Minister of Information Affairs 
(@iBahrain), all of which disseminate state official statements. The cluster also includes 
accounts of various media outlets and a few bloggers and entrepreneurs. There is no single 
common theme of discussion in this cluster; it is instead defined largely by its institutional 
participants. Another cluster contains accounts of Saudi Sunni religious clerics, media 
organizations, and journalists. Discussion is centered around local political, social, and religious 
issues with occasional commentary on regional affairs, including Bahrain. A Kuwaiti political 
cluster is populated by Kuwaiti parliament members, politicians, and political commentators as 
well as religious figures whose posts address political affairs in the country, the Gulf states, and 
the Middle East. A cluster within this group that pays particular attention to Egyptian politics is 
populated by Egyptian politicians, journalists, activists, and bloggers. The users in this cluster, 
especially the activists and bloggers, occasionally refer to political affairs in Bahrain. Another 
cluster is populated primarily by accounts of media organizations, many of which are pan-Arab, 
as well as accounts of individuals commenting on stories from those media outlets. Another 
cluster is populated by technology companies and accounts focused on international foreign 
policy. This cluster includes accounts of US technology companies such as Google and Twitter; 
media such as NY Times and CNN; politicians such as President Barack Obama and UK Prime 
Minister David Cameron; and a mix of accounts from the region from different backgrounds. 
The cluster is not conversational. There is also a cluster populated almost exclusively by 
accounts of English language and international media from Europe and North America, most of 
which cover global affairs and foreign policy. 
 
POLARIZATION	  AND	  DISCOURSE	  
Some official government accounts promote collegiality between the Sunni and Shiite sects. 
Such content is not uncommon in accounts such as that of Khalid Al-khalifa, Foreign Minister of 
Bahrain. In one tweet he posts a complimentary quote from a prominent historical Sunni figure 
about a Shiite scholar,100 and in another he says Sunni and Shiite sectarian schools learn from 
and respect each other and blames politics for polluting the relationship between the two sects.101 
Commenting on the terror attack that killed worshippers in Kuwait in June 2015, a Sunni 
religious cleric from Bahrain said the dispute with the Shiites does not justify killing them.102 
Opposition leaders tweet similar statements and make a distinction between the Sunni sect and 
politicians. For example, the account of the opposition group Alwefaq Society tweeted a 
statement from opposition leader Khalil Al-Marzouki saying: “When mosques are demolished 
we say the state did it, not the Sunnis. The state oppresses, not the Sunnis.”103 
 
                                                
100 Khalid bin Ahmed, Twitter post, Jun 29, 2015, 4:44 PM, 
https://twitter.com/khalidalkhalifa/status/615667218580287490. 
101 Khalid bin Ahmed, Twitter post, Jun 29, 2015, 5:16 PM, 
https://twitter.com/khalidalkhalifa/status/615675317168902145. 
102 Dr. Hasan al-Husaini, Jun 26, 2015, 3:27 PM, https://twitter.com/7usaini/status/614560602086715392. 
103 Alwefaq Society, Twitter post, Mar 16, 2014, 11:37 AM, 
https://twitter.com/ALWEFAQ/status/445267528169058304. 
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However, a sectarian narrative appears in the Bahraini Twittersphere in both the loyalists and the 
opposition networks. It is most visible in the accounts that use pseudonyms. Many accounts in 
the loyalist networks frame the loyalist-opposition tension as a Sunni-Shiite conflict. These 
accounts do not merely state that they are supporting the state, but explicitly say in their account 
descriptions that they are defending the Sunni community104 against what they call Rafida,105 a 
derogatory term used by some Sunni Muslims to refer to Shiite Muslims. Others in this network 
refer to Shiite political activists as Safavid106 (a dynasty in Persia), also a derogatory term used 
by Sunnis, which implies that the person is not originally Arab, but rather is of Persian origin. 
 
Some loyalists rhetorically connect opposition figures and activities to an Iranian agenda. For 
example, accounts supporting the monarchy welcomed the government order to block a forum 
website run by the opposition, and one user said the forum is affiliated with Iran’s Guardianship 
of the Jurist. One tweet twisted the Arabic name of the Iranian body to mean the “Guardianship 
of the Lewd Ones.”107 It is not uncommon for pseudonymous accounts in the loyalists network to 
refer to Bahraini Shiites using offensive terms, for example comparing them to animals,108 or for 
them to criticize Shiite religious concepts sarcastically, for example by referring to the 
“Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists.”109 
 
On the other side of the divide, users in the opposition network often accuse the state of sectarian 
bias. For example, some accounts accused the state security forces of protecting a newspaper 
building and preventing protests against the newspaper after it published what the tweet called an 
article insulting the Shiite sect in Bahrain.110 Other tweets said the Bahraini regime does not 
recognize and honor Shiite religious occasions such as Ashora,111 which is commemorated by 
Shiite Muslims as a day of mourning for the martyrdom of al-Hussein, the grandson of prophet 
Mohammed. Al-Hussein was killed in 680, an event that fueled a Shiite-Sunni rift and later a 
Shiite movement. Others critique the Sunni Muslim establishment in the country. For example, 
an activist tweeted that unlike the Sunni mosques, the Shiite mosques are more politically 
independent and thus not subject to regime’s political influence.112  Moreover, some accounts 
frame the rift between the state and the opposition in the context of the historical dispute between 
Shiites and Sunnis. For example, an account113 that highlights the plight of the Shiite population 
                                                
104 Examples: https://twitter.com/AL3AQEED_85, https://twitter.com/Al3AMEED_70, 
https://twitter.com/ALNAQ33B, and https://twitter.com/ALMO8ADAM_77. 
105 Example: https://twitter.com/bahraindefence. 
106 Examples: bahrainiriffai, Twitter post, Jan 3, 2013, 9:47 AM, 
https://twitter.com/bahrainiriffai/status/286891495745806337. and bahrain iriffai, Twitter post, Jan 9, 2013, 1:30 
PM, https://twitter.com/bahrainiriffai/status/289121963459350529. 
107 Samahat alsiyyd harikhum, Twitter post, Aug 3, 2013, 4:23 PM, 
https://twitter.com/7areghum/status/363802255121592320. 
108 Soqur alkhasah albahrainiyah, Twitter post, Sep 28, 2014, 1:15 PM, 
https://twitter.com/sagor565/status/516320194243723264. 
109 Wikalat anbaa yegoloon, Twitter post, Sep 1, 2014, 12:29 AM, 
https://twitter.com/YegoloonNews/status/506343108443787264. 
110 Elaam madinat alshuhada, Twitter post, Jul 24, 2014,  2:28 PM, 
https://twitter.com/Martyrs14Feb/status/492421123313659904. 
111South elhak, Twitter post, Sep 21, 2014, 4:13 AM, 
https://twitter.com/14FEBRiGhTVoiCe/status/513647077599895552. 
112 Nabeel Rajab, Twitter post, Jul 30, 2014, 12:22 AM, 
https://twitter.com/NABEELRAJAB/status/494382505248964608. 
113 @AlModmor, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/AlModmor. 
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in Bahrain and reports stories of what it calls the victims and martyrs of the regime's violence 
attaches to its tweets religiously loaded Arabic hashtags such as “al-Hussein is the leader of the 
revolutionaries.”  
 
The Twitter map seems to reflect deep-rooted divisions between the government loyalists and the 
opposition in Bahrain. We do not find strong evidence that the online space is bridging gaps 
between the rivals. In contrary, inflammatory rhetoric is loud, and collective action in the form of 
information campaigns from the adversaries against each other is strong. Also, there is limited 
conversation between the competing actors on how best to build cohesion, and when such 
conversation occurs it indicates that the division is more than just rhetorical. When the Foreign 
Minister of Bahrain tweeted that the presence of separate Mosques for Sunnis and other ones for 
Shiites invites schism and that Muslims should have one mosque and one prayer, a critical reply 
claimed discrimination at a wide level, saying there were government ministries for Sunnis and 
other ones for Shiites; schools for Sunnis and other ones for Shiites; job opportunities and 
scholarships for Sunnis and other ones for Shiites. Another one sarcastically asked the 
government official, “Is that why you demolished the Shiite mosques?”114 Similarly, when the 
Alwefaq Society opposition leader tweeted about blaming the state rather than the Sunnis for 
demolishing Shiite mosques, a user replied: “damn the Nawasib Sunnis of Bahrain.” (“Nawasib” 
is a religiously derogatory term used by some Shiites to refer to Sunnis.) 
 
On the other hand, the space does serve as a platform for citizens to express speech on various 
political and nonpolitical issues. Users within the loyalists clusters do often criticize the 
government on local policies, though most of the criticism is not addressed at the regime itself. 
For example, one tweet criticizes the government policy permitting the sale of alcohol in the 
local market. Discourse in these clusters is not strictly regime-aligned on foreign affairs. The 
perspectives of private citizens at times diverge from the positions put forth by the official 
accounts of government media outlets and officers. For example, it is not uncommon for private 
citizens to condemn and criticize Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s regime for various 
reasons. When Al-Sisi allegedly mocked oil-rich Arab states in a leaked audio recording,115 one 
tweet read “Al-Sisi despises the Gulf states. Ok, the Gulf states despise Al-Sisi.”116 
 
                                                
114 Khalid bin Ahmed, Twitter post, Jun 26, 2015, 4:37 AM, 
https://twitter.com/khalidalkhalifa/status/614396944706711552. 
115 “Egypt’s president allegedly mocks Gulf wealth,” BBC, February 10, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-
trending-31301903. 
116 Mansoor biezenellah, Twitter post, Feb 7, 2015, 1:44 PM, 
https://twitter.com/Mansor_Tariq/status/564177847363715072. 
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TUNISIAN	  TWITTER	  
 
Figure	  23:	  Tunisian	  Twitter	  Map 
 
Participation and dialogue on Twitter in Tunisia is heavily slanted towards activists and 
individual civil society voices and those with an interest in net freedom and human rights. Many 
of the most prominent users in the network were bloggers and early Internet adopters who 
pushed for Internet freedom and political reform in Tunisia. These users appear in a group of 
clusters where most of their activities promote human rights and democracy117 and anti-
censorship.118 Progressive movements such as Ettajdid (@ettajdid_tn) populate this group, and 
the discussion has a liberal outlook. The discourse has evolved to include new national concerns 
such as radicalism and corruption during incumbent governments. For example, users often 
express concern over what they consider radical religious practices in the society and within the 
government affiliated authorities;119 run initiatives to fight corruption and enhance 
transparency;120 support campaigns such as “Where is the oil” (a campaign that claimed 
                                                
117 @freetunisia, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/freetunisia. 
118 @Astrubaal, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/Astrubaal. 
119 Haythem El Mekki, Twitter post, Jul 1, 2015, 3:18 PM, 
https://twitter.com/ByLasKo/status/616370191929356288. 
120 @ IwatchTn, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/IwatchTn. 
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mismanagement and corruption in the government handling of the country’s national wealth in 
Tunisia); and report what they describe as police harassing and arresting activists.121 
 
Technology entrepreneurs,122 digital marketers, hackers,123 and techies124 whose interests are 
more on the social and entrepreneurial side of technology feature prominently in the map. Such 
users often engage in political discourse but not extensively. Also active in the map is a large 
community of private citizens who come from different backgrounds and do not seem to be 
involved in public or organized activities. The users post political and social commentary, but do 
not have a strong political agenda or focus and are not engaged in proactive activism. Their 
comments are often critical of politicians and politics but do not amount to committed activism. 
 
Politicians, political parties, and those with specific political agendas are less prominent on the 
map, and unlike in the Egypt and Bahrain maps, they do not occupy distinct sets of clusters. 
Accounts of government officials and institutions and of political parties and their leaders 
populate the same set of clusters. One cluster, for example, includes accounts of members from 
Al Massar Démocratique et Social (@samirtaiebTN), Al-Nahda party (@NahdhaTunisie), Le 
Congrès Pour la République (@CPRTunisie), bureau politique d'Ettakatol (@KhelilEzzaouia), 
former president Moncef Marzouki (@Moncef_Marzouki), parliamentarians (@iyeddahmani), 
and the Tunisian general Union of labor (@UGTT_TN).  The tweets in this cluster are primarily 
official statements from the account holders. Also, unlike in the Egypt and Bahrain maps, 
political state and non-state rivalries do not translate into political clusters and define the 
structures of the networks; among the politically-interested users in the map, following leaders 
from different political perspectives is not unusual. Moreover, the political discourse in clusters 
populated by politicians and political parties is not conversational; it is limited to mostly official 
statements and commentary. 
 
The structures of the map (and lack thereof) appear to be driven more by personal and social 
interests among a more homogenous network of users (compared to Egypt and Bahrain), which 
results in a less segmented network space. Worth noting is that Facebook has a much higher 
penetration rate compared to Twitter in Tunisia. As a Tunisian journalist puts it, “In Tunisia, 
Internet is Facebook.”125  The demographics of Twitter in Tunisia skew towards better educated 
professionals and those with secular and progressive world views. This appears still to be an elite 
discussion space, and thereby a poor reflection of the overall political and social sentiments in 
Tunisia. Politically and socially conservative voices do not have visible presence on the map. 
Because of the less than representative set of users, we are unable to conclude that the Twitter 
map is a clear reflection of lower political polarization in Tunisia. 
 
                                                
121 Bassam, Twitter post, Jun 6, 2015, 12:39 PM, https://twitter.com/tounsiwaftakhir/status/607270548608032769. 
122 @nayzek, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/nayzek. 
123 @turbopape, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/turbopape. 
124 @ aliboulila , Twitter account, https://twitter.com/aliboulila. 
125 Abdulmagsood Khadr, Masr al-Arabia, "Sahifa fransiya: Facebook yohaimin ala misr wa tunis wa almagrib," 
French newspaper: Facebook dominates in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, Jun 5, 2015, http://brk.mn/masralarabia 
(Arabic). 
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CORE	  GROUP	  
 
Figure	  24:	  Core	  Group 
 
Three clusters populated by the most popular accounts in the network occupy the center of map, 
with followers coming from across the network. The Core Group includes representation of the 
themes and communities found throughout the map, with the exception of few governmental 
voices. Users in this group are located primarily in Tunisia. They post in French, Arabic, and 
English and draw upon international news and conversations. Users in this group average several 
thousand followers from the overall network, which consists of just over ten thousand accounts. 
Discourse is centered around local political and social affairs as well as the intersection of 
technology and political and social development. Many users in this group advocate for political 
reform, digital rights, and net freedom. 
 
One of these clusters consists largely of free speech advocates and freelance reporters, and 
includes a number of satirists. Many followed accounts are protected. The general slant of 
discourse indicates support for Tunisia-based political and social organizations. Hashtags include 
“#nawaat” in reference to the Tunisian human rights organization. A second cluster shows a high 
interest in politics, including the Ennahda Party, and contains the accounts of prominent political 
figures and tech-focused users. The third cluster at the center of the map is populated 
predominantly by young, tech-oriented Tunisians. The discourse slants towards liberal and 
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progressive viewpoints. Users in this cluster are informed by diverse online resources such as 
Tunisian social media marketing pages and Bloomberg View. 
 
POLITICAL	  &	  SOCIAL	  COMMENTARY	  GROUP	  
 
Figure	  25:	  Political	  &	  Social	  Commentary	  Group 
 
The group is populated by users from diverse backgrounds, most of whom do not align 
themselves with any particular political agenda. Many of the users reside in Tunisia; others live 
in France and other countries. The users tweet about personal matters but comment on various 
local political and social affairs, entertainment, and sports. They also post reactions to events and 
media stories in the region and in the world. Though the commentary can be critical, the group as 
a collective does not adopt any particular political slant or agenda, nor does it engage in 
proactive activism on the various issues discussed. 
  
One of the three clusters in this group appears to consist predominantly of female voices and 
preferentially follow political commentators and politicians who are women. Some of the topics 
found in this group include Internet governance, European debates concerning international 
relations, and advice on using Twitter to reach audiences effectively. Many users in this group 
show an interest in technology and engineering. Others focus on popular culture, music, and 
sports. This group appears to be a younger demographic, given that some indicate affiliation with 
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a university in Tunisia and one of the most popular hashtags is “#reformecollege [reform 
university].” Finally, there is indication of a peripheral interest in mainstream, progressive 
politics (e.g., retweeting the Socialist Party of France and France 24 anchor @FrancoisF24, and 
linking to mainstream news sites) and world events (e.g., the “#cuba” hashtag). Several of the 
most popular accounts in this group are mainstream media sources from France, such as Le 
Monde. 
 
TECH	  FOCUS	  GROUP	  
This group is a community of mostly technology entrepreneurs, digital marketers, hackers, and 
techies, as well as bloggers and journalists. The group’s common interests center around the 
social and entrepreneurial side of technology, the use of digital tools for communication and 
marketing, and open source code. Political discourse is occasional and is often in reaction to 
major events. 
 
Figure	  26:	  Tech	  Focus	  Group 
 
Users in this group display an interest in open innovation, Internet policy, and politics through a 
tech prism (e.g., Anonymous, the French Pirate Party). Many users tend to have a hacker ethos 
and support issues related to a free and open Internet. Topics of interest include net neutrality 
and the first Arab Wikipedia conference (WikiArabia Tunisia), among other similar topics. 
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Twitter users in this group frequently link to news resources focused on social media, the Web, 
and entrepreneurship-focused publications, such as Kim Dotcom, Verge, The Next Web, and 
Business Insider. Compared to other clusters, users in this group tend to share links with English 
language and US sources, including business and tech oriented news coverage like Mashable and 
Fortune, and more academic sources like CFR and academia.edu. 
 
POLITICS	  &	  POLITICIANS	  GROUP	  
This group is comprised of accounts of government institutions and officials, parliamentarians, 
partisan politicians, and political parties from a wide political spectrum, including Al Massar 
Démocratique et Social, the Al-Nahda party, Le Congrès Pour la République, and bureau 
politique d'Ettakatol. The accounts tweet mostly official statements, and there is limited 
conversation and interaction between the users. Accounts of local and French political media 
appear among users in this group. 
 
 
Figure	  27:	  Politics	  &	  Politicians	  Group 
 
Users in these clusters are engaged with political stances and parties representing a diverse range 
of views. Both progressive secularist and Islamist representation exists in this group.  Attention 
to the press in this group is also diverse, split between French mainstream news media, Tunisian 
mainstream news media, and popular opposition channels. Posts are in both Arabic and French 
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and are about matters of national (and regional) relevance to Tunisia, such as oil and ISIS. A 
majority of the users are not public figures (few have over 1000 followers), but rather appear to 
be professionals or students. 
  
POLITICS,	  TECHNOLOGY	  &	  SOCIETY	  GROUP	  
 
Figure	  28:	  Politics,	  Technology	  &	  Society	  Group 
 
The group includes bloggers, activists, journalists, and political reformers posting about political 
progress and democratic transition in the country. The users are also interested in the use of 
technology for political and social development and promote protection of digital rights that have 
been acquired after the removal of President Ben Ali. Some of the accounts in this group include 
self-identified hackers and makers. Interest in cyberculture is common. Popular Twitter accounts 
followed include Nawaat, Takriz (“a cyber think/fight tank”), and the French Left Party. Users in 
this group tend to identify most often with progressive political viewpoints and show an interest 
in topics related to social justice. French is the most common language. 
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POLITICAL	  REFORM	  &	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  GROUP	  
 
Figure	  29:	  Political	  Reform	  &	  Human	  Rights	  Group 
 
This group is populated by prominent bloggers and early adopters who pushed for political 
reform, human rights, and Internet freedoms in Tunisia. The clusters also include civil society 
activists and journalists who discuss political and social progress in the country after the 
revolution that ousted Ben Ali, and the subsequent democratic transition process. Users express 
concern about progress in human rights practices, digital freedoms, and government 
transparency. New pressing issues such as terror activities in the country occupy the most recent 
discussions. The group has a generally progressive outlook on the government system. 
 
Users in this group are engaged with movements such Ettajdid and follow digital rights and anti-
censorship activists, as well as local watchdog organizations (e.g., I Watch) and human rights 
advocacy groups (e.g., Free Tunisia). A large majority of the users in this group are not well 
integrated with the overall network; they have a relatively small number of follows and 
followers. 
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REGIONAL	  MEDIA	  &	  ISLAM	  GROUP	  
 
Figure	  30:	  Regional	  Media	  &	  Islam	  Group 
 
This group contains various accounts from the region related to Islamist groups, such as the Al-
Nahda Party in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and individual politicians with an 
Islamist outlook, such as Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The cluster also includes 
accounts of prominent religious clerics from the Gulf countries, such as those of Mohamad 
Alarefe and Salman Alodah. Also in the cluster are accounts from regional media organizations 
such as Al-Jazeera TV and various journalists. The common theme in this cluster is interest in 
political Islam. Conversation is limited in this cluster, as the tweets are mostly statements, news, 
and views from the account holders. Posts in this cluster touch upon many related issues, 
including Nakba Day, the situation in Palestine, the Morsi trial in Egypt, and the plight of the 
Rohingya people from Myanmar. Twitter users in this cluster tend to post in Arabic. 
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INTERNATIONAL	  FOCUS	  GROUP	  
 
Figure	  31:	  International	  Focus	  Group 
 
The group is populated by regional and international media and regional and Western (especially 
US and French) journalists. The common interest is Middle East and North African and 
international affairs, French politics, and UN-related issues such as aid assistance. There is a 
strong human rights-oriented slant to the discourse, and advocacy-oriented sources are shared. 
The group is not conversational. 
 
One set of users in this group follows individuals such as Nicholas Kristof, feminist writer Mona 
Eltahawy, and Jillian C. York as well as major international news groups such as Global Voices, 
Foreign Policy, and The New Yorker, along with international bloggers. This cluster often posts 
in English and has a distinct focus on potential human rights violations outside of Tunisia, 
specifically in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Iraq, Oman, Bahrain, and elsewhere in the Middle 
East. Another cluster show more interest in French politicians and political media. A third cluster 
mainly follows and retweets French politicians affiliated with the Socialist Party (namely, 
François Hollande, Ségolène Royal, and Anne Hidalgo, the mayor of Paris).  A fourth cluster is 
distinctive in that it follows mainly news sites rather than individuals (i.e., CNN Arabic, 
France24, Al Arabiya, BBCWorld, and RTLFrance).  Most of the linked URLs are to left-leaning 
 52 
media sources in French and Arabic (with some links occasionally to Turkish journalists and 
newspapers like Hürriyet).   
 
ENTERTAINMENT	  &	  CULTURE	  GROUP	  
 
Figure	  32:	  Entertainment	  &	  Culture	  Group 
 
The primary focus of this group is on entertainment, pop culture, and popular public figures in 
the region, France, and the US. Some of the users direct their attention to North African and 
European pop culture, though many also follow American pop stars (such as Will I Am, Justin 
Bieber, and 50 Cent) and public figures (e.g., Jamel Debbouze, Bassem Youssef, Faisal al 
Qasim, Bill Gates, and Oprah Winfrey).  Prominent political figures are also followed in this 
group (e.g. Barack Obama, Mohamed ElBaradei), but there is little connectivity with political 
parties or activist groups. Mentions of sports teams are common. There is little conversation in 
this cluster. 
IMPLICATIONS	  AND	  DISCUSSION	  
The mapping of online spaces in the Arab world offers a distinctive perspective on the political 
and social issues that occupy the political discourse of the region. Digital media offers a 
particularly strong representation of the topics and ideas that citizens are motivated to share in a 
public forum. Although this certainly does not capture the full spectrum of preferences and 
 53 
perspectives in a society—there are opinions and interests that are not shared publicly for any 
number of reasons—it renders well the interests of those that are vocal and engaged. It is not 
surprising to find the voices of activists, political leaders, and public figures at the forefront of 
many online discussions. 
 
In Egypt and Bahrain, accounts from government, government officials, and politicians form an 
important portion of the most followed accounts (Table 1). In Tunisia, there are relatively more 
voices from civil society that occupy the top positions. Media organizations and journalists are 
important across all three networks. Public figures from arts and entertainment make up a 
significant portion of the most popular accounts in the Egyptian Twitter network. This includes 
poets, actors, and film industry professionals. Bassem Youssef has the highest number of 
followers in the network. 
 
 Top	  20 Top	  100 
Egypt Tunisia Bahrain Egypt Tunisia Bahrain 
Government 0 1 3 0 5 13  
Politicians 6 1 4 15 3 13 
Media	  Organizations 2 4 5 13 23 20 
Journalists 4 3 2 24 19 15 
NGOs 0 1 0 2 8 5 
Civil	  Society	  Actors 4 10 6 25 26 26 
Arts	  &	  Entertainment 4 0 0 11 4 1 
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 9 12 7  
Table	  1:	  Types	  of	  organizations	  and	  individuals	  that	  are	  most	  followed	  by	  users	  in	  the	  Egyptian,	  Tunisian,	  and	  
Bahraini	  Twitter	  networks.126 
 
The prominence of some of the most popular figures in the 3 country networks can be traced 
back to their activities offline and traditional media attention. One such example is the Bahraini 
political activist Nabeel Rajab, whose arrest by the Bahraini regime was widely covered by 
regional and international media and advocacy groups. Also among the top accounts in the 
Bahraini network are those affiliated with political opposition groups such as Al Wefaq and Al 
Wafa, known to work within state political and legal constraints. 
 
Similarly, many of the most followed accounts in the Egyptian network belong to users who are 
critical of the state political system and the restrictive measures on civil society, free speech, and 
political action. Some figures, for example Egyptian political science professor Amr Hamzawy, 
occasionally appear on TV channels as political commentators, which might have helped in 
                                                
126 Researchers manually reviewed the top 100 accounts and placed them into the categories listed in the table. The 
Government category includes government agencies, government spokespeople, and individuals currently holding 
office. The Politician category refers to those who do not currently hold office. Media organizations include both 
domestic and foreign media. Civil society actors broadly include individual voices from civil society, including 
bloggers and digital activists. Miscellaneous includes private companies and suspended accounts. 
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raising visibility to their online presences. Egyptian political satirist, Bassem Youssef, had his 
own TV show, which would have enlarged their online audience. 
 
The Tunisian network has far fewer accounts of TV personalities among the top followed as 
many seem to be primarily known for their activities in the digital space with the exception to the 
politicians and political party members. 
 
As more citizens come online, following and participating in discourse, the digital public sphere 
is fueled and shaped by a wider set of voices, perhaps better reflecting the interests and opinions 
of societies at large. The structure of the communities that form online denote social, religious, 
and political divisions as expressed by online users. The comparisons across different countries 
are illuminating; in comparing the networks of Twitter communities in Egypt, Tunisia, and 
Bahrain—an important but incomplete portion of the networked public sphere in each of these 
countries—the differences we see far exceed the similarities. The structure of Twitter networks 
in Egypt pivots upon the political polarization that has emerged over the past several years with 
three distinct poles: those aligned with the military, those that side with the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and those that prefer a civilian government not aligned with the military or Islamists (which we 
label non-aligned).127 In Bahrain, the map is also defined by political polarization. The divide 
between the government and opposition in Bahrain drives a wedge through the entire network 
and is exacerbated by the sectarian affiliations and strong rhetoric of the two sides. The Tunisian 
Twitter networks present a sharp contrast. The clusters in the Tunisian map are not so clearly 
articulated, and where they are strongest, they revolve around technology, digital rights, and civil 
society. The political rivalries in Tunisia are not yet evident in the structure of Twitter networks, 
although political rivalries in Tunisia are apparent in Facebook.128 
 
Focusing on the most popular accounts in each network that are engaged in political issues 
shows that Twitter leans decisively towards a distinct end of the political spectrum in all three 
countries. In Egypt, accounts for the non-aligned group account for 35 of the 37 most popular 
politically-oriented accounts (Table 2). In Tunisia, none of the popular political accounts are 
associated with an Islamist party (Table 3). In Bahrain, 45 out of the 50 popular political 
accounts are affiliated with or supportive of the opposition (Table 4). 
 
Accounts with a defined political agenda constitute 50 of the 100 most popular accounts in 
Bahrain. In Egypt, the number is 37 with more focus on arts and entertainment, and religion.  In 
Tunisia, 37 of the top 100 accounts have a political orientation. In both Egypt and Tunisia, 
voices from civil society are an important part of the conversation. Politicians make up a smaller 
portion of the list, and accounts affiliated with the current government are not among the most 
popular accounts. The evidence suggests that Twitter is primarily a venue for civil society 
discussants.   
 
                                                
127 This tripolar political mapping aligns closely with the analysis of online and offline civic engagement detailed in 
a companion paper. See: Nagla Rizk, et al., “The Networked Public Sphere and Civic Engagement, Egypt Study,” 
July 2015. 
128 Escander Nagazi and Jazem Halioui, “An accelerated story of the emergence and transformation of the 
Networked Public Sphere: Tunisia case in point,” July 2015. 
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 Civil	  Society	  Actors NGOs Politicians Government 
Government-­‐aligned 0 0 0 0 
Non-­‐aligned 20 2 13 0 
Muslim	  Brotherhood-­‐aligned 0 0 2 0 
Table	  2:	  Politically	  aligned	  organizations	  and	  individuals	  among	  the	  100	  most	  followed	  accounts	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  
Twitter	  network.129 
 
 Civil	  Society	  Actors NGOs Politicians Government 
Non-­‐Islamist 21 8 8 0 
Islamist 0 0 0 0 
Table	  3:	  Politically	  aligned	  organizations	  and	  individuals	  among	  the	  100	  most	  followed	  accounts	  in	  the	  Tunisian	  
Twitter	  network. 
 
 Civil	  Society	  Actors NGOs Politicians Government 
Local	  Government-­‐aligned 0 0 0 4 
Regional	  Government-­‐aligned 0 0 1 0 
Local	  Opposition 18 5 15 5 
Regional	  Opposition 1 0 1 0 
Table	  4:	  Politically	  aligned	  organizations	  and	  individuals	  among	  the	  100	  most	  followed	  accounts	  in	  the	  Bahraini	  
Twitter	  network. 
 
ALTERNATIVE	  MEDIA	  AND	  ACCOUNTABILITY	  
The networked public sphere continues to offer users a broad range of information sources and  
alternative views less subject to the influence of government and powerful institutions. 
Government online resources do not appear among the most followed accounts, and in Bahrain, 
where there is pervasive political Internet filtering, many of the blocked websites such as that of 
Bahrain Mirror are among the frequently used websites. User-generated content websites such as 
YouTube appear among the top used resources in Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia. 
 
We see examples of civil society activists working to hold their governments more accountable 
through online media. An example is the “Where is the Oil” campaign that claimed 
mismanagement and corruption in the government handling of the country’s national wealth in 
Tunisia.130 Political and human rights activists debated the issue on Twitter, with some tweeting 
photos of public demonstrations and police arrest of demonstrators. In Egypt, Twitter campaigns 
to free political activists, especially those who participated in the political activities that led to 
the January 2011 revolution, continue to emerge. Civil society activists hold the government 
responsible for the safety of the arrested ones and demand amendment of the demonstration law, 
which requires prior permission from the police to organize public demonstrations. In the 
                                                
129 Based on the manual review of the 100 accounts in each network with the most followers within the network, in 
Tables 2, 3, and 4, we tabulate those users that explicitly align with a political group and place them into categories.  
130 Eileen Byrne, “‘Where’s the oil?’ ask wary Tunisians,” The National, June 17, 2015, 
http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/wheres-the-oil-ask-wary-tunisians. 
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Bahrain map, some clusters are made up almost exclusively of anti-government campaigns to 
free jailed activists and demand political reform and equal citizenship rights. 
 
POLITICIZATION	  AND	  POLARIZATION	  IN	  THE	  NETWORKED	  PUBLIC	  SPHERE	  
A trend across the region is the increasing politicization and polarization of online spaces, 
coinciding with rising political and social polarization offline. In both Egypt and Bahrain, 
political contention is reflected in the structure of the Twitter maps. This research is helpful in 
evaluating and documenting polarization by providing a window into processes that are difficult 
to view and aggregate by other means. It may also provide a useful avenue by which to assess 
efforts to bridge social divides and the success of different strategies to foster more civil and 
productive dialogue between partisan groups.  
 
As well documented,131 the current online environment in Egypt is viewed by many of the early 
Internet adopters as less civil and less conducive for collective action. The tone and substance of 
dialogue between different factions in both Egypt and Bahrain indicate that the current online 
environment is not particularly conducive for deliberation. The politicization and polarization of 
online spaces is not unique to the region. In many respects, we are seeing the realization of many 
of the hopes for the networked public sphere as it offers a forum for the articulation and debate 
of different viewpoints by their adherents. The emergence of coalitions and communities online 
that represent different political perspectives is a natural and desirable step in any transition 
towards greater democratization.132 The concern—here and anywhere—is that growing 
partisanship fuels hostility, reduces the willingness to consider opposing views, and diminishes 
opportunities for political compromise.  
 
The decision of users to follow others with similar views—a phenomenon known as 
homophily133—is readily apparent in the network maps. There is no reason to believe that the 
affordances or features of online platforms are responsible for the polarization seen in these 
networks. The underlying political and social forces provide ample explanation for the current 
political environment without resorting to explanations that suggest that digital communication 
itself is at the root of the problem. Digital platforms do offer a venue to communicate deeply felt 
sentiments. The ability to express opinions anonymously is important here as well. In the 
Bahraini network, a substantial portion of the accounts that are responsible for offensive 
sectarian attacks are pseudonymous. Many observers may conclude that the plentiful polarizing 
rhetoric found in some political conversations on Twitter exacerbates distrust and enmity 
between rival communities and increases polarization. It is true that hostile sentiments on Twitter 
are open for all to see and that some of these sentiments might not be so visible otherwise. We do 
not, however, have sufficient evidence to conclude whether this polarizing rhetoric indeed makes 
matters worse. It is possible that the polarization online is simply a reflection of the underlying 
reality, and that it has no further impact. It is even plausible that heavily loaded rhetoric might 
even inspire rivals to work together to engender greater civility. This research does not buoy 
hopes that online spaces could somehow be buffered from offline animosity.  
                                                
131 Nagla Rizk, et al., “The Networked Public Sphere and Civic Engagement, Egypt Study,” July 2015. 
132 Rosenblum, Nancy L. (2008). On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship. Princeton 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
133 Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M Cook (2001). Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social 
Networks, Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 27: 415-444. 
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Understanding how the online and offline manifestations of partisan and sectarian divisions may 
exacerbate or mitigate one another is in all likelihood an unanswerable question, and this 
question is less meaningful as online and offline social processes become better integrated. 
Partisanship online might be best viewed as a stage in the maturation and filling out of online 
spaces. One prime example is the active presence of government actors and their supporters in 
the Twitter maps. This is a recent phenomenon; governments are almost entirely absent from the 
2009 blogosphere map. In Egypt, a cluster of accounts that support the Sisi government is a 
major part of the 2014 Twitter network. Six years earlier, there was little to no support for the 
Mubarak government visible in the blogosphere. In Bahrain, the government presence is still 
limited on Twitter and confined to issuance of statements. The government accounts are not 
conversational. When conversation between government actors and opponents occurs, it is 
mostly confrontational, and the opponents invoke grievances from the offline world. 
 
MIGRATING	  TO	  SOCIAL	  MEDIA	  
The shrinking Arabic blogosphere marks a generational shift in the networked public sphere in 
the region, coinciding with a marked rise in the adoption of social media and social networking 
platforms. A preponderance of activity in the Arab networked public sphere now appears to be 
on Facebook and Twitter, with adoption of other platforms such as Instagram and WhatsApp on 
the rise. Two prominent Egyptian bloggers, for example, stated in September 2014 that they have 
shifted from traditional blogging to short posting using social media websites.134  
 
There are likely a number of reasons behind this migration, and the reasons will vary by the 
individual. Given the broad global popularity of Twitter and Facebook, this comes as no surprise. 
Once a critical mass of early adopters established themselves, the strong network effects 
associated with both Facebook and Twitter would have undoubtedly prompted further migration. 
The increasing penetration of mobile phones and high rates of broadband on mobile devices 
likely plays a role. The ease of posting short messages on Facebook and Twitter on mobile 
devices could be pushing users away from longer blog posts.  
 
The relative ease of forming groups and expressing affiliations on Twitter and Facebook may 
also explain their rapid adoption of these platforms and the apparent shift of activist activity to 
these venues. On social media platforms, organizers and activists have a built-in audience and 
one can leapfrog from existing pages with similar orientations. For participants, the threshold for 
engagement is significantly lower and the platforms are designed to make is simple for users to 
comment, share, retweet, or “like” content, or to join a group on Facebook. Commenting on 
blogs or posting a post in response takes considerably more effort.  
 
Compared to the era preceding the Arab spring, there is little evidence of civil society organizing 
in the blogosphere.  In the survey of blogosphere activity conducted as a part of this study, we 
found no efforts to aggregate individual actors and promote social and political change. The 
decline in traditional blogging does not necessarily mean that there is a decrease in the use of 
Internet for civic engagement. The evidence suggests rather a shift in social mobilization from 
                                                
134 al-Arabyal-Jazeed, Misr: “Zaman altadween lam yantahi ba'd”, Blogging age is not over yet, Sept 5, 2014 
http://www.alaraby.co.uk/medianews/57e51c4e-f6bb-4bb9-b83b-78b456665a4d. 
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traditional blogging to microblogging and social media. Publicly visible online organizing, such 
as issue-based campaigns, promoting political protests and strikes, and election activities, appear 
to have moved almost entirely to Facebook and Twitter. Many of the citizen-organized political 
campaigns that used to be conducted on blogs now occur on social media. In August 2014, for 
example, activists launched a social media campaign in support of Egyptian activists Alaa Abd 
El Fattah, Ahmed Douma, Mohamed Adel, Wael Metwally and Mohamed Abdel Rahman, who 
had started hunger strikes to protest their detentions.135 
 
Twitter, Facebook, blogs, and digital media outlets, along with other online platforms, will 
continue to compete for the attention of readers and authors. And as part of the digital media 
landscape, these various platforms will not only crowd out one another but will also play 
complementary roles. Despite its decline, the Arab blogosphere still serves as a platform for 
sharing ideas via a distributed network and enables users to bypass traditional unidirectional 
media structures. The Arab blogosphere appears likely to continue as a platform for long-form 
writing, even if it is less often the center of political debates and less important for organizing 
collective action. 
 
The growing importance of large social media platforms may have important implications for the 
function and structure of the networked public sphere in the region. One set of issues relate to the 
governance of these platforms and the impact of company policies on freedom of expression. 
Specific actions and policies by Facebook to remove the accounts of activists have drawn much 
criticism. Facebook’s real name policy has often been at the center of controversy as activists 
have adopted pseudonyms to address legitimate security concerns only to see their accounts 
suspended for violated the company’s real name policy. This policy made these activists easy 
targets for opponents, who by flagging these accounts to Facebook could instigate their removal. 
In Egypt, for example, the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, one of the more important 
rallying points for the 2011 protests, was temporarily taken down in late 2010 because its 
administrators were using pseudonyms.136 While Facebook has taken steps to address these 
concerns and has begun to loosen the real name requirement,137 users on private platforms will 
always be subject to the company policies with limited recourse. Another longstanding issue is 
the content restrictions of private platforms. A prime example is human rights activists reporting 
on police torture and abuse who have seen their content taken down based on policies designed 
to limit violent content.138 
 
When activists and citizens use social media platforms, they are trusting these firms with their 
personal data, and in doing so are effectively outsourcing their data security to these firms.139 A 
lingering concern for many is the willingness of companies to cooperate with government 
                                                
135 “More detainees join hunger strike as activists start campaign,” Mada Masr, August 20, 2014, 
http://www.madamasr.com/content/more-detainees-join-hunger-strike-activists-start-campaign. 
136 Brendan Greeley, “The Fallacy of Facebook Diplomacy,” Bloomberg Business, February 2, 2011, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/content/11_07/b4215008414536.htm. 
137 Vindu Goel, “Facebook to Ease Policies on Using Real Names for Accounts,” New York Times, October 1, 2014, 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/facebook-agrees-to-ease-rules-on-real-names/. 
138 YouTube shuts down Egyptian anti-torture activist's account, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/11/29/youtube.activist/. 
139 Bruce Schneier, “Feudal Security,” December 3, 2012, 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/12/feudal_sec.html. 
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requests for identifying information. Warding off attacks by malicious hackers is another 
concern. Activists that use social networking platforms may be particularly vulnerable if 
adversaries are able to gain access to their accounts or accounts of their associates, which list all 
of their friends. Governments in both Egypt and Tunisia have reportedly sought this information 
to identify protesters.140 There is a strong argument that large platforms may provide better 
security for users than the practical alternatives, though many contest whether activists are better 
served by large platforms or decentralized open source alternatives. 
 
Although Twitter is not blocked in Bahrain, Egypt, or Tunisia, the restrictive legal frameworks 
used by the regimes in the region and the prosecution of activists for their political activities 
likely contribute to shaping the overall discourse online. In Bahrain for example, the authorities 
arbitrarily arrested dissident information providers.  Users may resort to self-censorship to avoid 
confrontation with the authorities on sensitive topics. It is hard to measure the extent of self-
censorship practice, but a study of the Saudi Twittersphere finds evidence that users temper the 
expression of sentiments online on certain sensitive issues when they fear retribution from 
authorities.141 The Twitter maps therefore should not be viewed as inclusive of all sentiments on 
political and social issues. Users are expected to adjust their online activities to take risk factors 
into consideration. 
 
Less well studied is the impact of the architecture and structural features of large platforms such 
as Facebook and Twitter on public discourse and how these structural elements interact with user 
behavior to influence the shape and function of the networked public sphere. Facebook’s own 
studies suggest how subtle cues can influence user behavior.142  There are many similarities 
between blogging and microblogging, and these similarities translate into a degree of overlap in 
the functional and structural elements of the blogosphere and Twittersphere as described in this 
study. Dhiraj Murthy asserts that the narrative style and substance of Twitter more closely 
resemble that of longer-form blogs when tweets are considered not individually but as a corpus 
of short communiqués.143 He adds that the corpus is qualitatively different from individual 
tweets, and once the stream of tweets is aggregated, this can comprise a coherent narrative. 
 
There are, however, many substantial differences between different platforms. The most obvious 
is the relative investment of time in each post. In most respects, the hurdle for participation is 
lower on Twitter, and that has both potentially positive and negative impacts on public discourse. 
It is that much easier to make positive contributions or to engage in harassment and 
counterproductive attacks. The mechanisms in blogs, microblogs, and social networking 
                                                
140 Alexis C. Madrigal, “The Inside Story of How Facebook Responded to Tunisian Hacks,” The Atlantic, January 
24, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/01/the-inside-story-of-how-facebook-responded-to-
tunisian-hacks/70044/. 
141 Noman, Helmi and Faris, Robert and Kelly, John, Openness and Restraint: Structure, Discourse, and Contention 
in Saudi Twitter (December 2015). Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2015-16. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2700944 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2700944 
142 Adam Kramer, Jamie Guillory, and Jeffrey Hancock, “Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional 
contagion through social networks,” PNAS, March 24, 2015, http://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8788.full. See 
also: J. Nathan Matias, “Were All Those Rainbow Profile Photos Another Facebook Study?,” The Atlantic, June 28, 
2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/06/were-all-those-rainbow-profile-photos-another-
facebook-experiment/397088/. 
143 Dhiraj Murthy, Twitter: Social Communication in the Twitter Age. S.l.: Polity Press, 2012. 
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platforms for citing and amplifying the ideas and work of others have both similarities and 
differences. Each platform offers mechanisms for amplifying the writing of specific users or 
particular posts. There are also potentially important differences in the interplay between 
visibility and vulnerability for users. Blogs are highly visible but also have a high degree of 
control over the manner in which others can respond and interact with them. Users on Twitter 
and Facebook who are highly visible are also vulnerable to harassment. Steps that can be taken 
to reduce vulnerability on social media also reduce visibility, and often move conversations out 
of the public sphere into more private areas. Another key difference is the nature of communities 
that emerge on different platforms. Communities that are defined topically or around 
professional interests play different functional roles in the networked public sphere compared to 
those that are primarily based on social connections. This is not well understood.   
 
The paths and prospects for digitally mediated social mobilization in the Arab world are 
markedly different from the first generation of digital activism and engagement via the 
networked public sphere. The networked public sphere is no longer solely steered by the early 
majority of reform-oriented activists and technologists. It is increasingly reflecting more 
traditional and mainstream viewpoints as late adopters join the space. Currently, a host of diverse 
voices are present including those of competing activists from dissidents to loyalists, Islamists to 
secularists, and rebels to conformists. The most consequential changes have occurred offline and 
the current digital landscape is a reflection of the wider social and political climate. It is not 
readily apparent whether the potential for leveraging digital technologies for civic engagement 
and collective action have risen or fallen over the past several years. It is almost certainly more 
complex and more challenging.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
